On Dynamic Adjustment and Comparative Statics Via the Implicit Function Theorem

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dc.contributor.authorBarthel, Anne
dc.contributor.authorHoffmann, Eric
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-26T16:41:37Z
dc.date.available2023-06-26T16:41:37Z
dc.date.issued2022-03-03
dc.description.abstractThe implicit function theorem (IFT) offers a way of deriving a correspondence between the parameter space and the Nash equilibria of a game. However, which equilibrium will actually emerge after a parameter change involves a dynamic adjustment process, which may significantly differ from IFT predictions. Utilizing the notion of local uniform contraction mappings, we show that IFT predictions are consistent with economic behavior at locally contraction stable equilibria, which is both a necessary and sufficient condition in games of strategic complements. When best response functions are monotone, we can address the convergence of play under more general adaptive dynamics.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11310/5462
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subject2022 Faculty Research Poster Session and Research Fairen_US
dc.subjectWest Texas A&M Universityen_US
dc.subjectDepartment of Accounting, Economics and Financeen_US
dc.subjectPosteren_US
dc.subjectImplicit function theoremen_US
dc.titleOn Dynamic Adjustment and Comparative Statics Via the Implicit Function Theoremen_US
dc.typePresentationen_US

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2022 Faculty Research Poster Session and Research Fair