

ANTI-ZIONISM DURING THE COLD WAR:
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3379
THE “BIG RED LIE”

By

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ABSTRACT

In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly equated Zionism with racism in their Resolution 3379. This decision was not an anomaly, but rather a product of the Cold War. Responding to political setbacks in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had long been propagating anti-Zionist rhetoric that was a blend of both Cold War politicization and latent anti-Semitism. This thesis examines both the political and prejudicial in order to emphasize the Cold War qualities of the resolution, as well as its impact on our modern vernacular.

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Introduction:

In the American vernacular today, the term Zionism is seldom used. Its etymology is not well known nor its meaning fully understood. It is glibly applied to either religious or political spheres, and is in fact too often used as a catch-all term.¹ This trend is worthy of thoughtful consideration and analysis, for Zionism as a word boasts a remarkable track record of reinvention and fluidity. What began as a political movement under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, Zionism rose to prominence in late-nineteenth century Europe.² As the nationalist movement of the Jewish people, Zionism urged Jews across Europe to immigrate to Palestine, the Biblical Holy Land. After half a century, the Zionist dream of autonomy was fulfilled with the creation of Israel in 1948. The story does not end there though, for both the Jewish state and the term Zionism have been at the center of controversy ever since.

¹ United States Department of State, “Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism: A report provided to the United States Congress,” www.state.gov/documents/organization/102301.pdf (accessed October 4, 2016), 26-7. This 2008 report acknowledges this phenomenon by saying, “In contemporary discourse, those who use the terms ‘Zionism’ or ‘Zionists’ as a pejorative often assert that they have no problem with Jewish people; rather, it is the ‘Zionists’ with whom they disagree. Frequently, no distinction is made between ‘Zionists’ and ‘Jews,’ regardless of whether or not the Jews are Israelis or whether or not the Jews support the policy of Israel. The two terms often are used interchangeably.” The report was compiled during the tenure of Dr. Gregg Rickman as the Secretary of State’s Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. With a Ph.D. in International Relations, Rickman had previously served as the Director of Congressional Affairs at the Republican Jewish Coalition, and on the staff of the House International Relations Committee.

² A Budapest born Jew, Herzl authored influential works such as the pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) and the novel *Altneuland* (The Old New Land). In these seminal works of the Zionist movement, Herzl encouraged Europe’s Jews to create their own autonomous nation. Despairing at the rise of anti-Semitism – notably the Russian pogroms and the so-called Dreyfus Affair in France – Zionist leaders convened in Basel, Switzerland in 1897 for what was the First Zionist Conference. For more on the early history of Zionism, see David Vital’s *The Origins of Zionism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

Given the perpetual struggle between Palestinian and Jewish claims to self-determination in the Holy Land, Israel is often the focus of the world's attention. This was certainly true during the Cold War when political paranoia, subterfuge, and duplicity were endemic and the term Zionism increasingly denoted a nefarious and prejudicial ideology.³ In the Middle Eastern theater, the Soviet Union and the United States regularly crossed swords – the former was allied with the Arab nations while the latter most often assisted Israel. After a string of military setbacks in the region, most notably in 1967 and 1973, the Soviets looked to gain the upper hand over their Cold War counterparts. Drawing upon a legacy of anti-Semitism and exploiting the world's newfound awareness of human rights, the Soviet Union looked to castigate Israel via rhetorical means. Patience, propaganda, and shrewd delegating enabled the Soviet Union to achieve its goal. The climax of the anti-Zionist movement came in 1975 when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 3379, which officially defined Zionism as racism, but it remains largely forgotten.

An appalling lack of adequate historical conservation, considering both the political and prejudicial, must be credited for this oversight. In regards to the former, there is a wealth of scholarship speaking to the political Middle East during the Cold War. Former Israeli Ambassador Michael B. Oren's *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* is a perfect example. Expertly written, Oren's

³ United States Department of State, "Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism: A report provided to the United States Congress," 4. The potential overlapping of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism is also addressed in the report: "Anti-Semitism has proven to be an adaptive phenomenon. New forms of anti-Semitism have evolved. They often incorporate elements of traditional anti-Semitism. However, the distinguishing feature of the new anti-Semitism is criticism of Zionism or Israeli policy that – whether intentionally or unintentionally – has the effect of promoting prejudice against all Jews by demonizing Israel and Israelis and attributing Israel's perceived faults to its Jewish character."

narrative wrestles with the most notable, and controversial, event in Israeli military history. The Six-Day War was hugely influential in the overall Soviet anti-Zionist movement, but because of the work's political focus, Oren does not discuss it. Likewise, historian Craig Daigle's *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973*, is an indispensable book in the study of Israeli Cold War history. Analyzing the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War, Daigle compellingly slices and dices through the tangled web of misinterpretation so characteristic of the détente era, but again little mention is made of the rhetorical battle the superpowers waged concurrently.

Looking beyond the battlefield, historian Henry L. Feingold's "*Silent No More: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American Effort, 1967-1989*", skillfully analyzes another obscure Cold War issue – the Soviet Jewry movement. This was when the Soviet Union responded to Israel's resounding 1967 success by refusing emigration to Israel for most Soviet Jews; a policy that remained in effect for over twenty years. Despite coinciding with the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign, Feingold's thesis devotes very little time to connecting or even overlapping the two phenomena.

This disappointing trend is seen in other, more prejudicially-minded works as well. The notable historian Bernard Lewis, in his work *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice*, methodically dissects the issues of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. An expert on the issue, Lewis still only mentions the UN decision in passing. Approaching the subject from a different direction are two divergent works addressing the issue of the Middle Eastern post-Holocaust narrative. The first is *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust*, by historians Meir Litvak and

Ester Webman, and the second, social scientist Gilbert Achcar's *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives*. Both examine how the Arab world has rhetorically responded to the Holocaust and its aftermath. While the propagation of anti-Zionist rhetoric is discussed, the 1975 decision scarcely garners mention.

Thankfully, though, there are a few notable exceptions. The best example is historian Gil Troy's recent book, *Moynihan's Moment: America's Fight against Zionism as Racism*. An intelligent monologue from start to finish, Troy deftly scrutinizes the American fight against the Zionism-is-racism charge and regularly emphasizes the Cold War's influence on the whole episode. Similarly, political scientist Yohanan Manor analyzes the legacy of the resolution in his book, *To Right a Wrong: The Revocation of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 Defaming Zionism*. A meticulously organized work, Manor adroitly conveys his expert knowledge on the subject, but the focus is on the aftermath rather than the development of the issue. For that one would have to consult the astute historian William Korey and his most relevant work: *Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism*. Korey's scrutiny of the Soviet anti-Zionist movement is unquestionably authoritative and enlightening. However, all three of these fail to connect the history of Zionism and Israel with the enduring legacy of anti-Semitism and the Cold War stimuli that provoked the Soviet Union into action.

UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 did not emerge from a vacuum, but was rather a Cold War manifestation of Soviet anti-Semitism meant to serve a very clear political purpose. Though the Soviets' policy was not always dictated by anti-Zionism – they were just the second nation to acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel in 1948 – they

did come to draw upon their historical prejudice in order to undermine two Cold War rivals, namely Israel and the United States. In this light, the gravity and substance of UNGA 3379 is obvious. The rhetoric of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign, which utilized terms such as colonialist, imperialist, and racist, endures to this day in relation to Israel.⁴ Racist claims such as these, according to the European Union Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia's (EUMC) "Working Definition of Antisemitism," are patently anti-Semitic.⁵ If it was clearly understood how these terms first came to enter the anti-Israel lexicon, their veracity could be reasonably questioned and their authority challenged.

The story begins not in 1975 or even 1948, but just prior to the First World War. It was during this period that the Middle East endured a massive reorganization that left it in the clutches of British and French imperialism. The vestiges of deceit so evident in this era would pull taut the rope between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. The exit of the European powers following World War II would do little to alleviate the tension, and the ensuing divide between East and West during the Cold War would in fact make matters worse. Military clashes that drew the attention and ire of the international community would only widen the divide between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Embarrassed and embittered by repeated Israeli success on the battlefield, the Soviets would then begin to pursue alternative methods of warfare. Thus arose the anti-Zionist

⁴ The ever-growing Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement defines Zionism as a "racist ideology", and charges Israel with an assortment of crimes that include colonialism, apartheid, and ethnic cleansing. <https://bdsmovement.net/> (accessed August 11, 2016).

⁵ European Parliament Working Group on Antisemitism, "EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism," <http://www.antisem.eu/projects/eumc-working-definition-of-antisemitism/> (accessed October 5, 2016). The definition says that "Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor," is a manifestation of anti-Semitism.

campaign, which was a clever amalgam of Nazi methodology and entrenched Russian anti-Semitism.⁶ All of this must be understood and appreciated in order to fully grasp the underlying nature of the anti-Zionist movement, the pinnacle of which was UNGA 3379.

The decision to define Zionism, a political movement, as racist was not the product of chance. Nor was it empty bluster. Rather it was the product of a carefully devised and patiently implemented propaganda campaign behind which lay the Soviet Union. The impetus was not entirely prejudicial – though anti-Semitism was most certainly a factor – but rather a clever ploy to undermine a political challenger. Absent the Cold War the anti-Zionist movement would have been superfluous and even ridiculous, but there was a Cold War and the movement was real. The 1975 decision to define Zionism as racism was in itself reprehensible, but it is the perpetuation of the language that is more troubling. Why should vocabulary born out of the Cold War be allowed to endure if its origin is understood to be nothing more than misrepresentation?

⁶ The most notable example of Russian anti-Semitism would be the widely distributed publication entitled *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, released in 1903. Intensely anti-Semitic, the *Protocols* exposed the alleged “secret plans” of Jews who were conspiring for world domination. Despite being debunked as a forgery, the *Protocols* remain accessible fodder for modern anti-Semites.

SECTION I: CHRONOLOGY, 1900-1948

Chapter I:

World War I and the British Mandate

With the rise of Osman I at the close of the thirteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was born. Expanding and eventually encompassing all of what we now call the Middle East, the Turkish powerhouse would retain its authority through the end of World War I, when it was divided as spoils amongst the victor nations of Europe.¹ Of course, this span of more than six centuries is much too long to examine herein, but the Empire's final years are of no minor import. As the world swiftly industrialized, terms such as imperialism, colonialism, and the like, began to emerge in the national conscience of many European nations, most notably those of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Unfortunately for the Ottomans, this strengthening of European empires coincided with their own decline. After so many years of uninterrupted rule, the Ottomans had grown weak, largely due to their inability to effectively govern the many different ethnic and religious factions within their borders. Claiming dominion over Arab Muslims, Armenian Christians, and Jews (both resident and immigrant) – to name but a

¹ James Renton, "Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918," *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 3 (September, 2007): 647, 653, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20175115> (accessed November 27, 2015). Renton argues that the term "Middle East," in place of "Asiatic Turkey," was a product of British Orientalism and later nationalism. Despite the merits of Renton's argument, this thesis project will use the moniker "Middle East" as it is more familiar.

few – the Ottoman Turks were finding it increasingly difficult to uphold authority while also maintaining the defense and finances of such a large empire. Truth be told, the proverbial writing on the wall was there, but the Ottoman will to endure would prove surprisingly tenacious.

The late nineteenth century proved especially trying as the so-called Great Game was raging between two burgeoning powers – Great Britain and Russia. With both nations pitted against one another in their struggle to assert control across the globe, the territory of the Ottoman Empire began to look increasingly attractive. Russia's interests were twofold: reclaim Constantinople – the sacred city of Orthodox Christianity – and gain warm water access via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits.¹ Great Britain, for her part, cared for little but the safety of her most precious and most vulnerable colony, India.² To this end, the British took over financial control of Egypt in 1882 despite its belonging to the Turks. The simple reason for this imperial maneuvering was the Suez Canal, which served as a prime transit route between Great Britain and India.³ Beset from both sides, the Ottoman leadership was on shaky ground at the turn of the century.

To make matters worse, the phenomenon of globalization, a natural by-product of industrialization, made its presence known in the Ottoman world by the dawn of the

¹ Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*, (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 32. Rogan is a fellow of St. Anthony's College and a professor of the Modern History of the Middle East at Oxford University.

² David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1989), 26-7. Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Boston University, Fromkin has served as Director of the Center for International Relations and been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His stated specializations are international relations, international law, and Middle Eastern politics.

³ Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2012), 30. History professor at Georgia Tech University, Schneer won the National Jewish Book Award for this particular monologue.

twentieth century. This was most obvious in the construction of international railways, the most notable being the Berlin-Baghdad line. According to author Patricia Goldstone, its opening was to be a grand affair which “became a symbol of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and of the invasion of the East by the spirit of Western enterprise.”⁴ More than just a viable link between East and West, the railway did much to underscore the importance of a highly precious commodity – oil. To be sure, with the expansion of the railway, as well as the large-scale transitioning away from coal in naval vessels, oil was becoming invaluable.

Not just a two-player game, the race for oil attracted many powers, including the United States. Desperate to remain relevant and self-sufficient on the eve of the First World War, America’s Standard Oil Company actively sought opportunities in the Middle East and was indeed granted access by the Ottoman government.⁵ Likewise, European interest in the region was piqued and would prove insatiable as the time for widespread war approached. As it were, the Ottoman Empire stood vulnerable in the face of European advancement, and as historian David Fromkin asserts, “The assumption that when the Ottoman Empire disappeared, Europe would have to take its place proved to be

⁴ Patricia Goldstone, *Aaronsohn’s Maps: The Man Who Might Have Created Peace in the Middle East*, (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press, 2007), 20. Goldstone is a journalist who has written for the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Washington Post*.

⁵ Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to Present*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 326-27. American-born Oren is best known as the Israeli Ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2013; Goldstone, *Aaronsohn’s Maps*, 49-50; Scott Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2013), 46-49. As revealed by Anderson, an experienced war correspondent and contributing writer for the *New York Times Magazine*, the Standard Oil Company of New York had in fact employed two young men, William Yale and Rudolf McGovern, to quietly scout the land for oil deposits while pretending to be wealthy “playboys.” After several weeks of examining the Dead Sea region, they would eventually find what looked to be a likely oil reservoir near Beersheba. Not long after they encountered T.E. Lawrence, who was busy with his own clandestine wanderings.

one of those motors that drive history.”⁶ Indeed, World War I would prove the undoing of the Ottoman Empire, leaving a large swath of land seemingly unclaimed and in need of European assistance.

In the middle of this great whirlwind of upheaval sat Palestine, the land desired by many. For the Jewish people, the Biblical homeland of their forebears had long served as a beacon of hope in a dark world. At the mid-point of the nineteenth century, the Jewish population living in Palestine numbered only about twelve thousand.⁷ The size of the *Yishuv*, or Jewish population in Palestine, would increase as a result of the First *Aliyah* – return of the Jewish diaspora to the Holy Land. These Eastern European Jews immigrated prior to 1885 and were predominantly bourgeois and actively sought to cultivate agriculture and working relations with their Arab neighbors.⁸ Those Jews coming later in the century, by contrast, were fleeing the anti-Semitism of Europe and Russia and were more inclined to Socialist and/or revolutionary dogmas. This so-called Second *Aliyah* proved prone to isolationism and distrust, especially where the Arabs and Turks were concerned.⁹ By 1896 the Jewish population in Palestine had increased, and in fact comprised the majority in Jerusalem – over 25,000 in the city alone.¹⁰

These formative years of the Zionist community in Palestine proved crucial. The Arab communities there, fearing the significance of a large Jewish population, urged Ottoman officials to restrict Jewish immigration. While certain measures were put into

⁶ Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 32.

⁷ Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration*, 9-11.

⁸ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 2, 36.

⁹ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 36.

¹⁰ Amy Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007), 41. Harvard graduate and Pulitzer Prize winner, Dockser Marcus of the *Wall Street Journal* worked as the Middle East correspondent from 1991 to 1998.

place, governmental corruption and ineptitude prevented their having any real impact.¹¹ It was not Jewish immigration, though, that proved the greatest threat to the *status quo*, but rather the astute land purchases of the Zionists. Zionist leadership realized that in order to enjoy any sort of longevity in Palestine, the Jews must have land of their own. To this end, they began purchasing land from willing Arab sellers with the backing of prominent Jewish patrons, most notably the eminent Rothschilds. Albert Antebi, a Zionist leader from Damascus led the charge to purchase tracts of land throughout Palestine (see Appendix A, Figure 1). He understood the necessity of a strong network of connected Jewish settlements, and thereby sought out adjoining parcels.¹² This system would ultimately lead to the creation of the *kibbutzim*, but more importantly, as Jerusalem mayor Yusuf Khalidi would discover, it would enable the Zionists to create a sort of “miniature state within a state.”¹³ This tension between the Jewish and Arab communities was boiling underneath the surface of a fractious and sickly Ottoman Empire as World War I commenced. Needless to say, it would not long remain hidden, but rather would garner the attention of faraway European powers looking to satiate their robust appetites.

The Ottoman Empire, just prior to the First World War, underwent a severe political shift when the Young Turk revolutionary movement deposed the autocratic sultan Abdülhamid II and established a new government under the umbrella of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908-1909.¹⁴ The scent of revolution spread

¹¹ Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 43-4.

¹² Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 50-3.

¹³ Yusuf Khalidi quoted in Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 76-7, 93.

¹⁴ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 1-9.

throughout the empire, and as historian Eugene Rogan succinctly states, “For most people the Young Turk Revolution inspired a newfound sense of hope and freedom that was nothing short of intoxicating.”¹⁵ Likewise, journalist Amy Dockser Marcus argues that the “air of freedom [the Young Turks] inspired made it possible, at least initially, for the Jews and Arabs to imagine themselves as the creators of their own destinies.”¹⁶ And so it was that the land of Palestine, already rife with tension, was stewing with the notions of revolution and self-determination, and the Europeans would quickly exploit it.

By the time of the Archduke’s death in Sarajevo in 1914, the CUP had aligned itself with Germany.¹⁷ Not surprising, their friendship had been in the making for several years; Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II had in fact visited the Ottoman Empire in 1896 and expressed his regard for the Sultan and his caliphate.¹⁸ This arrangement naturally set the empire at odds with the Entente – Great Britain, France, and Russia – thereby excusing imperial interests in the region as a matter of war. Great Britain was eager to intervene in the Middle East, but a new and dreadful threat presented itself – *jihad*. The Ottoman government officially declared war against the Entente on November 2, 1914, and just nine days later came the call for *jihad* issued by the Sultan.¹⁹ This was significant because Great Britain had control of not only Egypt, but India as well, which was home

¹⁵ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 6.

¹⁶ Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 23.

¹⁷ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 34-9. While there is certainly a shared history between Germany and the Ottomans, their alliance was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Young Turks, cognizant of their need for a defensive partner, had approached both the British and French, but were summarily rebuffed.

¹⁸ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 34-9; Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 29-39. Theodor Herzl, the patriarch of Zionism, had in fact journeyed to Jerusalem in an effort of gaining an audience with the Kaiser, whom he hoped would sponsor Zionism. After their quick meeting, Herzl wrote in his diary, “He said neither yes nor no.”

¹⁹ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 47-52. The Sultan enjoyed not only secular authority within the Ottoman Empire, but also the religious office of Caliph, thereby making him leader of Muslims worldwide.

to over sixty-five million Muslims whom the Germans had identified "...as the Achilles' heel of the British Empire."²⁰ They hoped to create enough unrest in the periphery to distract from the fight on the western front.

Thankfully for the British, little came of the threat as there was such a lack of cohesion within the Muslim world. What it did succeed in doing, though, was to encourage the British to pursue other means of subversion in the Ottoman realm, most notably the sponsorship of the Arab Revolt. Britain's Lord Kitchener struck a deal with Sharif Hussein of Hejaz promising British support of Arab independence in exchange for loyalty to Britain rather than the Sultan.²¹ Later, after the British humiliation at Gallipoli, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence began wherein Sir Henry McMahon noncommittally hinted at British approval of a post-war Arab kingdom. Ambiguous from start to finish, the shared letters were riddled with duplicity and politicking from both sides and would most certainly prove disastrous later on. That aside, Anglo-French relations were far more important to the British government and would lead ultimately to a far more ill-fated bargain.²²

In the midst of the melee sat Palestine, which was under the thumb of the mercurial Turk Djemal Pasha. Beleaguered by Turkish brutality, famine, and a locust plague of near Biblical proportions, the Holy Land was struggling while the celebrated T.E. Lawrence was stirring up the Arabs for revolution. However, Palestine's Jews were

²⁰ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 70.

²¹ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 276-77.

²² Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 276-85; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 70. As Morris argues, where McMahon used the phrase "independence of the Arabs," he was most certainly referring to independence from Turkey rather than autonomy. And to this end, McMahon wrote that the Arab governments "would need to be advised and assisted by the British."

not without their own local hero. A Romanian-born agronomist who had arrived with his family in the First *Aliyah*, the towering Aaron Aaronsohn was a rash and fiercely independent young scientist whose lofty dreams of a restored Zion were immutable.²³ Quick to notice Palestine's precarious situation in WWI and its potential to shape the future, Aaronsohn took action. While the immensely clever and suave Chaim Weizmann was busily touting Zionism's qualities in London, Aaronsohn created *Nezah Israel Lo Ieshaker* (NILI).²⁴ This spy ring worked diligently to provide the British with current and relevant information about conditions in Palestine. Bolstered by Aaronsohn's particular knowledge of the land – as an agronomist and cartographer – the British found his information to be invaluable to the war effort. Of course, no matter his worth, Aaronsohn was unhappily at the mercy of the fickle and sluggish British bureaucracy.

While Great Britain was sponsoring the Arab Revolt and expressing their interest in a Zionist Palestine, they were also forming a coalition with the French.²⁵ Sir Mark Sykes, the enigmatic and capricious British statesman, working in tandem with France's François Georges-Picot, devised the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement in May of 1916, wherein the post-war dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire between the two powers was agreed upon.²⁶ Unbeknownst to most all, this literal backroom deal undercut the

²³ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 1-9, 39-40, 73. The Aaronsohn family settled in Zichron Ya'akov, and in 1906 Aaron's most important discovery as an agronomist occurred when he spotted wild *emmer* wheat. This feat led to the development of the American-sponsored Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station, which during wartime would serve as the perfect cover for Aaronsohn's spy ring in Palestine.

²⁴ Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 278-9. Meaning of Hebrew: The Eternal One of Israel does not lie or relent. Aaron worked in tandem with his beloved sister, Rivka, to provide the British with creditable intelligence.

²⁵ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 172.

²⁶ "The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916" in the Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp (accessed October 8, 2014).

promises made to the Arabs and gave birth to a century's worth of hostility, though its duplicitousness would not be revealed for some time.²⁷ The question of Palestine, however, remained vague – neither France nor Great Britain staked claim to the Holy Land, but rather designated it as an international zone. However, the British, most especially Sykes, had their heart set on a rather different arrangement.²⁸

Mark Sykes' opinions of Zionism had undergone a series of drastic changes. Previously an anti-Semite, Sykes eventually perceived the issue through a religious lens. As a Catholic he viewed the massacre of the Armenian Christians as an absolute atrocity, thereby fueling his belief in Britain's right to assert dominance in the Turks' domain. Accordingly, he believed the return of the Jews to Palestine would right a wrong while serving the Empire's purposes, leading him to recruit Aaron Aaronsohn, in whom he saw a great deal of potential.²⁹

Sentimentality, though, was not the predominant stimulus. Sykes was first and foremost a politician, and he had come to believe, perhaps due to his anti-Semitic inclinations, that the Jewish diaspora wielded a great deal of power. Historian Scott Anderson maintains that Sykes believed the "Entente's coming out in strong support of a Jewish homeland in Palestine... would inevitably turn the opinion of international Jewry toward its side. In turn, the advocacy of American Jews – a small but powerful constituency – might finally provide the spur for bringing the United States into the

²⁷ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 286. Russia granted its approval of the Agreement in 1916, but none other was made privy to the arrangement.

²⁸ "The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916."

²⁹ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 119-20; Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 229-31.

war."³⁰ Believing the Jews had the ability to directly affect the war, Sykes strove to convince his peers of the importance of a Jewish Palestine. Thus, his Zionism was wed to his paranoia, eventually leading to yet another British promise of solidarity, this time to the Jews of the world.

When David Lloyd George replaced H.H. Asquith as British Prime Minister in December 1916, the alliance between Great Britain and Zionism began to take shape. A religiously-minded Zionist who harbored deep-seated disdain for the Ottoman Turks, Lloyd George firmly believed the war effort could be won in the East rather than in the trenches.³¹ According to Rogan, "[Lloyd George] argued for a vigorous campaign against the Ottomans in Palestine, convinced the conquest of Jerusalem would give the British public opinion a much-needed boost after the ghastly losses at Verdun and the Somme."³² Not only would a British-ruled Palestine fit nicely with his Zionist proclivities, but it would also provide for the integrity of the Suez Canal, safe access to India, and proximity to the Berlin-Baghdad line. Sir Mark Sykes and Aaron Aaronsohn, each in their own way, would be more than happy to see Lloyd George's plans realized.

³⁰ Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 230.

³¹ Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 264-75; Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 217. Fromkin details Lloyd George's considerable knowledge of and first-hand experience with the Zionist movement. From a personal standpoint, the Prime Minister is described as the "only man in his government who had always wanted to acquire Palestine for Britain. He also wanted to encourage the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine." Fromkin later labels him a "Christian Zionist," for it was his Biblical knowledge and faith that fed his Zionism. Professionally, his law firm Lloyd George, Roberts & Co., had represented Theodor Herzl in 1903 when he was earnestly seeking the benefaction of the British government for the creation of Zionist enclaves in either Cyprus or the El Arish strip. This is not to say, however, that Lloyd George disregarded the obvious political advantages involved in the development of a British protectorate in Palestine.

³² Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 217.

Following the Ottoman victory in the Second Battle of Gaza in April of 1917, General Archibald Murray was replaced by General Edmund Allenby, whose assignment from the Prime Minister was to conquer Jerusalem by Christmas as a “present to the war-weary British public.”³³ In a meeting with Aaronsohn in Cairo, Allenby soaked up the agronomist’s intelligence and thusly devised an attack route different from that of his predecessor. While Murray had twice targeted Gaza (moving North from the British-controlled Sinai), Aaronsohn recommended an assault on Beersheba first.³⁴ The subsequent Third Battle of Gaza commenced and by October 31, 1917 Allenby’s forces had successfully surprised and ousted Ottoman forces from Beersheba.³⁵ The British army would then turn their attention to their next target – Gaza.

As Allenby’s troops were undoing the Turks in Beersheba, Aaron Aaronsohn and Chaim Weizmann sat nervously outside the War Cabinet’s conference room in Whitehall, wherein a decision that would determine the fate of Zionism was being made. Despite his promises to the French, Sir Mark Sykes had long been urging the British government to officially offer their support to a Jewish Palestine, and it would be this walking contradiction of a man who would open the door and joyfully declare, “Dr. Weizmann, it’s a boy!”³⁶ And so it was that Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour, forgoing all pomp and circumstance, would send a letter to Lionel Walter Rothschild two days later stating:

³³ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 330-33, 343. In the Battle of Gaza, the British suffered over six thousand casualties while the Ottomans lost just over two thousand.

³⁴ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn’s Maps*, 169.

³⁵ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 343-47.

³⁶ Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 388.

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.³⁷

This assurance from the British would be kept quiet for a few days, but its importance cannot be understated. Since the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70, no nation, government, or culture had so unequivocally championed the Jewish people's yearning for Zion, and for it to come from a world power was anything but trivial.

Of course, those on the battlefield cared little for the domestic trifles of bureaucracy, and so the Third Battle of Gaza continued. Moving troops north into Hebron, Allenby made the Turks fear a direct assault on Jerusalem, thereby leaving Gaza extremely vulnerable. After a week of intensive fighting, the British entered a completely decimated Gaza on November 7, 1917.³⁸ Indeed, the city had been "subjected to the heaviest bombardment witnessed anywhere outside the European theatres of war... [and had been] reduced to a ghost of a city."³⁹ The fall of Gaza effectively allowed

³⁷ Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, November 2, 1917, in the Modern History Sourcebook, under "The Balfour Declaration," <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/balfour.asp> (accessed October 18, 2011).

³⁸ West Point United States Military Academy, "Palestine, 1917. Operations Fall of 1917: Third Battle of Gaza, Capture of Jerusalem," map, <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20I/WWOne49.jpg> (accessed November 27, 2015).

³⁹ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 346-48.

Allenby to supply and protect his troops as they made their push towards the ultimate prize – Jerusalem.

The so-called Balfour Declaration was published by the *Times* on November 9, 1917, making known to the world British support for Zionism. Zionists throughout the world were invigorated by the joyous news, as well as the seemingly imminent capture of their most sacred city. Moreover, President Woodrow Wilson's eventual, though tenuous, approval of the arrangement greatly energized American Zionism, which would grow in strength as a result.⁴⁰ However, the reality of the situation is perhaps best stated by Eugene Rogan, who wrote, "On the face of it, Lord Balfour was offering Palestine to the Zionist Movement. In fact, Lloyd George's government was using the Zionist movement to secure Palestine for British rule."⁴¹ Such was the unfortunate truth, for Mark Sykes, with all his politicking and courting, was not a fervent Zionist so much as he was a British politician.

Lloyd George's desire for a happy Christmas would be realized early, as the Turks surrendered Jerusalem to the British on December 9. Two days later, General Allenby would triumphantly walk into the Old City, signaling the beginning of a new era in Palestine – though it would still be many months before the whole of the country was in British hands.⁴² Nonetheless, things were progressing at a remarkable rate – the Jews had been bereft of their holy city, which had been under Ottoman rule for over four hundred years, for nigh on two millennia. For so much to happen within a week's time

⁴⁰ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 362-65; Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 299-301; Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 395-98.

⁴¹ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 350.

⁴² Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 350-53.

was truly impressive and encouraging. In America, Zionist fervor was palpable as the good news leapt the Atlantic, but in Great Britain, the victory in Jerusalem was symbolic for vastly different reasons.

Conveniently ignoring the muddled promises of Hussein-McMahon and Sykes-Picot, the British also disregarded Arab fidelity to the land, even the small sliver of Palestine. Rather, the focus was entirely upon the sustainability of empire in a time of war. Indeed, while Great Britain had been furtively funding the Arab Revolt, they were also contriving the notion of a holy war of their own in Palestine via propaganda and rhetoric.⁴³ Whether they resurrected the imagery of the Crusades or embraced the notions of Orientalism, British policy makers were desperately striving to rationalize their tangled web of duplicity.⁴⁴ Never mind their own historic dalliance with anti-Semitism – consider the expulsion of 1290, the slaying of St. Hugh of Lincoln, and Shylock’s pecuniary cruelty – the British were prepared to almost single-handedly correct a historic wrong, but they would soon discover that Middle Eastern politics were messy at even the best of times.⁴⁵

⁴³ Eitan Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 1 (January, 2001): 89-92, 98, <http://jstor.org/stable/261132> (accessed December 3, 2015). Bar-Yosef persuasively argues that the British government strove to paint the struggle in the Middle East as another Crusade. Moreover, “the battle over Jerusalem was perceived first and foremost as the mythical struggle between Christianity and Islam, a dichotomy in which the Jews had little part to play.”

⁴⁴ Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade?” 98. For a deeper exploration into the issue of Orientalism, see Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

⁴⁵ The Jews of England were expelled by King Edward I on July 18, 1290 following a century’s worth of discrimination and violence. Referring to the popular blood libels of the time, little St. Hugh of Lincoln was a Christian boy allegedly killed by Jews, an idea that resurfaced in many English stories, including Geoffrey Chaucer’s *The Prioress’s Tale*. William Shakespeare’s Shylock was the Jewish mercenary who demanded his “pound of flesh” in *The Merchant of Venice*. For further exploration into the issue of British anti-Semitism in the Middle Ages, see both Anthony Julius’ truly spectacular work *Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and the celebrated *Shakespeare and the Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) by James Shapiro.

The last year of the war, 1918, would be witness to many changes. In March, the Russians would withdraw from the conflict in order to deal with the riotous Bolsheviks, and after Allenby's complete conquest of Palestine in September, the Ottomans would sign an armistice with Great Britain on October 30.⁴⁶ All attention would then turn back to the fields of Europe until an armistice with Germany was struck, opening the door to official peace negotiations. David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau would be joined by the idealistic Woodrow Wilson in Paris, who together began divvying the spoils of war. Despite a great many skeletons in their closet, the British were finally given the chance to gerrymander their way into a sizeable post-war colonial empire.

Many different ideologies and nationalities converged on Paris in 1919, but not all found success. The Zionists, dependent upon the goodwill of the British, busily strove to ensure the viability of their dream. Aaron Aaronsohn, credited by General Allenby as the mastermind of the Palestine campaign, chartered a Paris-bound plane in order to present his carefully drawn-up maps of an independent Palestine. Despite his great intellect and zeal, the agronomist suffered a highly suspicious death in a plane crash that was described as "one of the strangest accidents in aviation history."⁴⁷ With him were lost not only the maps, but the Zionist dreams characteristic of the early *Yishuv*. Consequently, the ideals of the European Zionists, namely Chaim Weizmann, would claim prominence. This fact fit quite nicely with the plans of the British.

⁴⁶ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 380-83.

⁴⁷ Goldstone, *Aaronsohn's Maps*, 188, 227-31; Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia*, 496-97. No body was recovered, his final journal entries were lost, and the British government is, to this day, mum on the subject of Aaronsohn's demise. Despite the circumstantial evidence of foul play, the death of Aaronsohn signaled the death of a sort of Zionism that believed in the viability of working relationships with the Arab community.

The British, for their part, were busy placating the many parties present in Paris. Their collusion with the French *à la* Sykes-Picot had become public knowledge in late 1917 thanks to the Bolsheviks.⁴⁸ Effectively negating the earlier string of promises made to the Arabs,⁴⁹ Sykes-Picot had become a source of vexation for the British, who wanted nothing more than to solidify their presence in the Middle East *sans* the French.⁵⁰ Moreover, the participation of Woodrow Wilson, armed with his anti-imperialist Fourteen Points, was proving to be yet another source of consternation for Lloyd George's government. Point Twelve, which unequivocally stated that "...nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development," left little room for doubt regarding America's position, and yet the British seemed wholly indifferent. Because Wilson had purposefully refrained from war with the Ottomans, his opinions were easily ignored by Lloyd George, who would have his empire.⁵¹

The signing of the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919 signaled the end of the European war, but the Ottoman issue remained unresolved. Convening in San

⁴⁸ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 372.

⁴⁹ Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 401. The string of British promises is quite extensive, as per Fromkin's list: "The Constantinople Agreement (1915), the Treaty of London (1915), the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (1915-16), the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), the Agreement of St Jean de Maurienne (1917), the Balfour Declaration (1917), the Hogarth message (1918), the Declaration to the Seven (1918), and the Anglo-French Declaration (1918)."

⁵⁰ French anti-Zionist activities in the Middle East would be an irritant to the British as they were working to determine the borders of Post-Ottoman Palestine. The British perceived these actions to be proof of French interest in making Palestine part of a unified Syria. A British telegram stresses the tenuous situation in the region: "You will realize how easy it is in Palestine to conduct a very dangerous propaganda [campaign] and how easy it will be to wreck at its outset our administration and policy of His Majesty's Government." No. 212: Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon, telegram, March 2, 1920 in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, XIII, eds. Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, and M.E. Lambert, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1963), 219-20.

⁵¹ "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," in the Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson17.asp (accessed December 28, 2015).

Remo, where the Mediterranean vistas served as a Dorian Gray, Great Britain, France, and Italy unapologetically dismembered the Ottoman Empire.⁵² The task was easy as they had given themselves unmitigated authority to establish so-called mandatory governments via Article Twenty-Two of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was stated therein that “Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone.”⁵³ Armed with this self-awarded scepter, France got Syria – including Lebanon – while the British controlled Palestine and Mesopotamia.⁵⁴ With little choice but to submit, the Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sévres on August 10, 1920, officially bringing to an end its six-hundred year rule.⁵⁵ It was not so much the end of an era as it was the beginning of a new – Palestine, and the rest of the Middle East, were to become European.

All would be finalized on July 24, 1922 when the British Mandate for Palestine was established under the umbrella of the League of Nations (see Appendix A, Figure 2). Great Britain was charged with ensuring the integrity of the holy sites, protecting the

⁵² The British plans for Palestine are laid out in a telegram sent by Earl Curzon in San Remo to Lord Hardinge on April 26, 1920. He wrote, “As regards Palestine an Article is also to be inserted in [the] Peace Treaty entrusting administration to a mandatory, whose duties are defined by a verbatim repetition of Mr. Balfour’s declaration of November 1917. Here again the boundaries will not be defined in [the] Peace Treaty but are to be determined at a later date by principal Allied Powers. The mandatory is not mentioned in [the] Treaty, but by an independent decision of Supreme Council was declared to be Great Britain.” No. 243: Earl Curzon (San Remo) to Lord Hardinge, telegram, April 26, 1920 in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 251-2.

⁵³ “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” in the Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp (accessed February 6, 2016).

⁵⁴ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 392.

⁵⁵ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 394-95. A Turkish Republic would be formed on October 29, 1923.

religious freedoms of Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and maintaining the security of the land. More to the point, though, the British vowed to place the “country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home” and to “facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions.”⁵⁶ Reveling in the fulfillment of Lord Balfour’s assurances, the Zionist community had every reason to celebrate. Though they did not yet enjoy autonomy, the patronage of the British was nonetheless encouraging. Of course, both parties failed to appreciate the position of the Arabs, who were still incensed by the deception epitomized in Hussein-McMahon and the Arab Revolt. These issues were far from buried.

The Mandatory period in Palestine was a time riddled with tension and hostility. Though the British had ostensibly secured Palestine for the Jews, in practice they were far from dedicated to the cause. Jerusalem, under the watchful eye of Governor Ronald Storrs, was developing as per a European model – fifty new neighborhoods were constructed, with two-thirds being Jewish. However, this separation of Arab and Jew signaled growing nationalism in the two camps, which in turn led to increased violence and terrorism.⁵⁷ Consequently, the British frequently re-evaluated the *status quo*. In 1930, following intense Arab revolts of the previous year, Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield published his White Paper, wherein he questioned Great Britain’s support of Zionism. Though the paper was withdrawn, it set the tone for the ensuing decade. In 1937 Lord Robert Peel led an investigative commission wherein it was determined

⁵⁶ “British Mandate for Palestine,” *American Journal of International Law* 17, no. 3 (July, 1923): 165, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212958> (accessed October 4, 2011).

⁵⁷ Dockser Marcus, *Jerusalem 1913*, 160-64.

Palestine ought to be divided into an Arab, Jewish, and Mandatory state, respectively.⁵⁸

This would be considered until 1939 when a great many things would change.

Great Britain, preparing for another war with Germany and fearing continued Arab unrest, which would threaten the Crown's access to oil, released yet another White Paper. Unlike its predecessor, though, the British White Paper of 1939 was a grievous blow to the Zionist community. Effectively abandoning the guarantees of the Balfour Declaration, the British government declared:

...the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country... His Majesty's Government regard any such expectations as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated... the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic populations, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded IN PALESTINE. But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of

⁵⁸ Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration*, 374-75.

Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State
against their will.⁵⁹

In addition to their sudden interest in honoring the promises of old, the British effectively stymied all Jewish immigration into Palestine (since 1922, more than three-hundred thousand Jews had entered the country).⁶⁰ This was disastrous to Zionism because it not only threatened the survival of a Jewish Palestine, but also that of the Jewish diaspora – Hitler’s anti-Semitic Third Reich was quickly spreading across Europe.

The First World War transformed the Middle East. It caused not only the demise of the Ottoman Empire, which had enjoyed a lengthy tenure, but also the entrenchment of European powers in the region *vis-à-vis* the Mandatory system. This arrangement was a strange amalgam of the old and new – imperialism and internationalism.⁶¹ What’s more, it was tenuously founded on a heap of conflicting wartime agreements concerning the same swathe of territory. It was assured, almost from the beginning, that there would be a winner and a loser. The great bargaining chip – Palestine – wound up in the hands of the British and would be home to both Jews and Arabs. Both parties would endure the fickle authority of the British, and both would be pitted against the other time and time again. This post-war era in Mandatory Palestine, so steeped in European imperial dogmas, would leave a bitter legacy for decades to come and would prove to be the root of a great many Arab-Zionist conflicts. The irony is, neither the Arab nor the Jew had much choice in the matter.

⁵⁹ “British White Paper of 1939,” in the Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp (accessed October 8, 2014).

⁶⁰ “British White Paper of 1939.”

⁶¹ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.

Chapter II:

World War II and the Birth of Israel

The mounting turmoil in the Middle East notwithstanding, the world in the 1930s was moving swiftly toward yet another world war. While the European powers readied themselves for the conflict, the Jews and Arabs of British Mandatory Palestine remained as they were – under the thumb of an imperial government. Though neither could exert much influence of their own, both would undoubtedly feel the effects of such a war.

Whether the Jews were fighting against stringent immigration quotas or lobbying for a fighting force of their own, they remained ever at the mercy of the British. Concurrently the Arab leadership in Palestine strove to subvert the colonial leadership by creating ties with Nazi Germany all while resisting Zionist progress. In the end, little could be accomplished by either party, as the ground war in Europe drew everyone's attention. And yet, as few could have anticipated, the war left in its wake an entirely new world order. The old imperial powers of Europe were replaced by two new superpowers, both of whom would come to wield a great deal of influence in the tiny region of Palestine.

In Palestine the British Mandatory government was struggling to maintain order. Adhering to the tenets of the 1939 White Paper, the British had imposed strict quotas for

Jewish immigrants in spite of the overt anti-Semitism of the Third Reich.¹ Great Britain's reasoning had everything to do with their anxiety to placate the Arab world, who held the key to oil and were therefore crucial allies in a drawn-out war with Germany.² And yet their rule in Palestine was under extreme duress as an irate *Yishuv* (Jewish community in Palestine) increasingly defied British authority. What's more, open conflicts between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine were escalating in both frequency and ferocity. Much like World War I, the British were left to pander to a host of incompatible opinions, and it was clear they would never be able to simultaneously mollify both Arabs and Jews while balancing their wartime concerns. Something had to give, but the tension was taut.

The primary concern for the *Yishuv* was the White Paper and the issue of immigration. Not only were Europe's Jews threatened by Hitler's megalomania, but the *Yishuv* itself was in a rather precarious position. Having yet to reach a state of full maturity, the Jewish community of Palestine relied on a steady influx of immigrant Jews to bolster its size and strength. With immigration stymied by the British, their condition was tenuous at best. To make matters worse, British Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald terminated all further land sales to Jews on February 28, 1940 via the

¹ In September of 1935, the Nazi regime enacted the thoroughly anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws. Herein Jews were prohibited from displaying the Nazi flag or colors, and both marriages and relations of any sort between a Jew and non-Jew were forbidden. "Nuremberg Race Laws: Translation," in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007903> (accessed October 6, 2016).

² Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 236. A professor of Modern History, Sachar maintains that from the British perspective, the issue of immigration extended beyond the Arab-Jew conflict of Palestine. As the Nazis had originally encouraged Jews to leave Germany, the British were quick to believe that a steady flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine would incur Arab wrath and lead to widespread pro-Nazi sentiment, thereby undermining the war effort.

Palestine Land Transfers Regulations.³ It was the British belief that continued Jewish land purchases would create a crisis of Arab homelessness, while the *Yishuv* argued the new policy created a “pale of settlement in the country of the national home.”⁴ Regardless of opinion, the Zionist situation in Palestine had become dire. Unable to procure more people or territory, the *Yishuv* faced almost certain ruin.

As should be expected, illegal immigration activities redoubled during this period, with European refugees smuggled in on steamers. Despite it all the British remained staunch in their policy and frequently redirected the ships to islands such as Mauritius and later Cyprus, where displaced persons (DP) camps were built. Unfortunately this program resulted in several tragedies, most notably the explosion of the *Patria* in 1940 which caused the death of over three hundred Jewish refugees, and the 1942 sinking of the *Struma* wherein all but one of almost eight hundred passengers drowned.⁵ Frustration mounting, the *Yishuv* grew increasingly restless and manifestly violent, and yet their focus shifted onto Hitler as he posed a greater threat to the survival of not only the *Yishuv*, but of Jewry as a whole. It was the Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion’s proclamation that “We shall fight Hitler as if there were no White Paper and fight the

³ Paul L. Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), 153.

⁴ Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine*, 153.

⁵ Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy: The Day Israel was Born* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973), 82-3. B’nai B’rith’s Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy of the American Jewish Committee tell the story. The *Struma* docked at Istanbul on December 16, 1941, and the Jewish Agency in Palestine feverishly petitioned the British to allow entry to the children aboard, if not everyone. Glacial in their deliberations, the British finally granted visas to children between eleven and sixteen, but by that time the Turks had cast off the dilapidated ship, which sunk in the Black Sea. The Jewish response to the tragedy was swift. In Palestine signs were posted which read, “MURDER – Wanted for Murder by Drowning of 800 Refugees on Board the Struma,” with an attached portrait of British High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael.

White Paper as if there were no Hitler.”⁶ To this end, the *Yishuv* looked to join the war effort alongside an unlikely ally – Great Britain.

Just prior to the outbreak of war, Chaim Weizmann had made clear the Jews’ unwavering support for Great Britain, but Prime Minister Chamberlain was coolly taciturn. When the philo-Semitic Winston Churchill gained office the next year, though, there was a warming of relations between the two parties. So much so, in fact, that when the *Yishuv* requested a Jewish fighting force be organized, Churchill was quite amenable to the idea. An army of ten thousand Jews, four thousand drawn directly from Palestine, was to be trained in England before returning to the Middle East, but before the plan could begin it was sidelined by British bureaucrats.⁷ Disinterested in remaining static, the *Yishuv*’s underground military force and precursor to the modern-day Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the *Haganah*, quietly augmented its structure. When German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel began moving through the Middle East, British interest in a Jewish militia returned. As such, the elite *Palmach* strike force was developed to repel German progression.⁸ While this arrangement certainly favored the British, it was even more important to the survival of the *Yishuv*. Enjoying the freedom to openly organize and train, the *Haganah* was gaining valuable experience that would translate to the eventual struggle with the Arabs.

As the Jews were busy with the British, the Arab leadership of Palestine was working towards an entirely different arrangement. Haj Amin al-Husseini had been

⁶ Golda Meir, *My Life* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), 158. Golda Meir was a leading Zionist pioneer in Israel, where she served as Prime Minister from 1969 to 1974.

⁷ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 231-32.

⁸ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 233-36.

given the office of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem by the British back in 1921, and as such was the supreme religious leader of the region.⁹ Fervently anti-British and anti-Semitic, al-Husseini had proven himself consistently contrarian to British authority. Instigator of the Arab riots of 1928-1929 and the revolt of 1936-1938, which led to the White Paper of a year later, al-Husseini strove to topple the Mandate and expel the Jews at every turn. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Mufti pursued a relationship with Great Britain's ultimate enemy – Nazi Germany. Like the Ottomans in World War I, al-Husseini anticipated a German victory. To this end, he traveled to Berlin and met with Hitler in November of 1941. Both loathsome of the British and Jews, the two got on quite well and quickly struck an alliance.¹⁰ The Führer approved the creation of an Arab fighting force and utilized the Mufti's fervor for propaganda campaigns throughout the Arab world – again, much like with the Ottomans and their call for *jihad*.¹¹ The outcome, too, would be similar as little came of the Mufti's scheming.

Despite the fomenting of Nazi ideology at al-Husseini's behest and the merging of British and Jewish forces, nothing could eclipse the rumors streaming into the Western world by late 1941 and 1942. Accounts of the Holocaust reached the ears of stunned Jews in Palestine but their calls for swift action from the governments of Britain and

⁹ David G. Dalin and John F. Rothmann, *Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), 14-18. Rabbi and historian David D. Dalin and John F. Rothmann of the Fromm Institute at the University of San Francisco relay the story of al-Husseini's appointment, which was really quite a coup. British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, was tasked with finding a suitable candidate for Mufti, and a number of qualified individuals were nominated. And yet, in a strange twist of fate, Samuel, perhaps attempting to over-compensate for his own Jewish identity, unaccountably selected al-Husseini over the raucous objections of both the Arabs and British. His decision would prove disastrous, as the new Mufti would be a perpetual thorn in the side of the British Mandatory government.

¹⁰ Dalin and Rothmann, *Icon of Evil*, 43-52.

¹¹ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 228-29.

America went unheeded. In fact, little would be done throughout the remainder of the war – both powers expressed logistical difficulties as reason for their inaction.¹² The tragedy of the Holocaust would long haunt both the *Yishuv* and Diaspora, and would serve as the greatest rallying cry of Zionism. More importantly, it aroused pro-Jewish sentiment throughout the world at the most opportune time, for it had become increasingly clear that the perpetuation of the British Mandate was untenable. Broken by the war, Great Britain's days as an empire were fleeting, and as such, a new solution to the quandary of Palestine was considered. For the Arabs, who were on the losing side of a world war once again, little could be done to sway public opinion. All they could do was watch as the fate of Palestine was decided by distant powers yet again.

While the world's attention was focused on the machinations of Hitler, several different diplomatic exercises were taking place in regards to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Of course the British efforts led the charge, with the Peel¹³ and Woodhead¹⁴ Commissions of 1937 and 1938 respectively, as well as the subsequent White Paper. The Jews, all too aware of their precarious position both within and without Palestine, strove to clarify their position officially. Convening at the Hotel Biltmore in New York in May

¹² Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 238-40.

¹³ Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine*, 126-31. In July of 1937 the Peel Commission, or Royal Commission Report, was developed under the command of Lord Robert Peel in response to the supreme unrest of the Arab Revolt of 1936-1938. Hearing both Jewish and Arab testimony regarding the state of affairs in Palestine, it was determined that coexistence between the two parties was no longer plausible, thereby making a partition of the region the only viable option. As such, the creation of distinct Arab and Jewish districts with Jerusalem belonging to neither was recommended. These suggestions were devised as an attempt to assuage the Arab dissidents and would serve as a template for later partition schemes.

¹⁴ Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine*, 131-40. It did not take the Mandatory leadership long to realize the idea of partition was unrealistic in its application, and with the findings of the Woodhead Commission presented to Parliament in November of 1938, the notion was effectively abandoned. Of course, this meant nothing had changed in Palestine.

of 1942, six hundred Jewish delegates adopted an explicit resolution to “develop Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.”¹⁵ Not since the Basel Declaration of 1897 had Zionist policy been so candid as to express forthwith the desire for statehood. With the news of the extermination camps and the uncertainty in Palestine, the so-called Biltmore Program was endorsed by both the Jewish Agency, governing body of the *Yishuv*, and the American Jewish Conference. In fact, for the first time ever, American-Jewish sentiment was decidedly in favor of Zionism. As one of the largest Jewish enclaves in the world, this was no small accomplishment.

Standing in opposition to the *Yishuv*’s Jewish Agency was the newly created League of Arab States, or Arab League. Encouraged by Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, the Arab League, developed in March of 1945, was comprised of seven nations overseen by a secretary general, and represented “forty-five million people spread over three million square miles, an entity thirty times more populous and two hundred times larger than Palestine. Under their desert wastes lay the world’s most important proven reserves of petroleum. They had at their command five regular armies,” and they would proclaim in 1947 their “resolve to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and to preserve Palestine as a united, independent state.”¹⁶ Bevin had believed the League would prove amenable to British interests in the region, but Anglophilia was

¹⁵ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 84-6.

¹⁶ Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *O Jerusalem! Day By Day and Minute By Minute, the Historic Struggle for Jerusalem and the Birth of Israel* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1972), 75-9. Journalists Collins and Lapierre list the seven nations represented by the Arab League: Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Transjordan. The sitting Secretary General at the time was Egypt’s Abdurrahman Azzam Pasha.

nonexistent.¹⁷ More importantly, the Arab League, though riven by internal disputes, represented the Arab world's pervasive antipathy to the Zionist goals so clearly outlined in the Biltmore Program. By the close of WWII it was clear to all that a Palestinian solution of any sort would invariably provoke violence from one side or the other.

Despite the assurance of difficulty, the post-Holocaust world did not sit idly and do nothing. This was certainly true for newly named U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who had long harbored fond feelings for Zionism and the Jewish people. Unlike his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was stubbornly reticent on the issue, Truman was quick to take action. Privy to the depravity of the Nazi death camps, Truman strove to aid the survivors, but met with British resistance. With Jews being housed in DP camps in Europe, there was an obvious need for the gates of Palestine to be thrown open. Truman was of the opinion that the White Paper contradicted the promises of Balfour, and was furthermore nonsensical as the Arabs, via al-Husseini, had openly sided with the Nazis.¹⁸ Because America was undeniably a world power by this time, Truman believed it imperative that they utilize their influence. As such, at the Potsdam Conference of 1945, Truman requested the British rescind the White Paper and give entry to the refugees. The British refused. When asked later about America's position on Palestine, Truman unequivocally stated:

¹⁷ Collins and Dominique, *O Jerusalem!*, 78. Not only was the Arab League disinclined to negotiate with the British on any issue, they were also keen on cultivating a relationship with the Soviet Union. Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General, had experience in such arenas as he had reached out to Lenin while the Bolshevik Revolution was still in its infancy. With the Cold War in full swing, this dichotomy is most certainly worth noting.

¹⁸ Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, *A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 84-5. Husband and wife team, the Radoshes are both historians who have taught at the City University of New York.

The American view of Palestine is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs so that if a State can be set up there, they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.¹⁹

In August, Truman wrote British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and suggested one-hundred thousand²⁰ Jewish refugees be allowed into Palestine immediately.²¹ When the British balked at this, an incensed *Haganah* commenced its first armed insurrection against the British and swiftly inflicted damage both materially and otherwise. Without options, Ernest Bevin responded by requesting a joint committee be formed to research possible resolutions. Truman consented.²²

The resultant Anglo-American Committee met first in Washington and then London – where Bevin promised his complete acceptance of their ultimate decision – before finally traveling to Jerusalem. Listening to an assortment of testimony, the

¹⁹ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 88.

²⁰ This number came out of the Harrison Report, which relayed the abominable conditions of the DP camps. The answer, Earl G. Harrison reported, was to increase immigration into Palestine.

²¹ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 94-6. While Truman openly favored increased immigration, his feelings were not acknowledged as official policy by the State Department. Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed Palestine was incapable of receiving so many refugees. What's more, while Truman was writing Atlee, State was drafting a memo which formalized its position: "The United States should not favor a mass or unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine." They added that nothing be done until both the British and Arabs had been consulted. This divergence of policy between the White House and State Department would have serious consequences down the road.

²² Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 262-63. Sachar makes the valid point when arguing that Ernest Bevin, whose propensity for favoring the Arabs was well known, made a fatal mistake in deriding the Jews when he said on November 2nd that "if the Jews, with all their suffering, want to get too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all." Britain was no longer in a position to speak so brazenly, and yet they held tight to their imperial habits.

Committee formulated and released its decision in May of 1946 – it upheld Truman’s request from August prior and put forward the idea of a unified state that could accommodate a “regime in which further Jewish immigration would neither be subject to an Arab veto nor be allowed to grow to such numbers as to produce a Jewish majority.”²³ Bevin categorically refused, Truman endorsed the decision publically, and Atlee demanded America foot the bill. At loggerheads, Truman conceded the need for further inquiry into the matter.

Two months later the Grady-Morrison Report was released which proposed the division of Palestine into two separate provinces – one for the Jews and one for the Arabs – with Jerusalem and the Negev (desert in the southern portion of Palestine) remaining under the authority of the British Mandatory government.²⁴ The plan was wildly unpopular, leaving Truman with little choice but to withhold his approval of the scheme, thereby dissolving the Anglo-American Committee. The chronic failure convinced the Jewish Agency to reconsider their options. Despite the bold proclamations of the Biltmore Program, they voiced their acquiescence of a partition so long as they had adequate land and complete autonomy, especially in regards to immigration. Conversely, the Arabs flatly refused and countered with demands for the dissolution of the Mandate, termination of all Jewish immigration, and the creation of an Arab state.²⁵ Progress seemed illusory.

²³ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 262-63.

²⁴ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 172-73. A *New York Times* article is cited as reporting that the Jews would only get 1,500 square miles via this plan, as compared to 2,600 from the rejected Peel Commission Report of ten years earlier.

²⁵ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 181-84.

Eventually one of the Arabs' demands would be met, though in a roundabout manner. By early 1947 it was abundantly clear the British Mandate could no longer carry on as it had, and so Ernest Bevin announced his decision to refer the issue of Palestine to the United Nations (UN), heir to the League of Nations' mantle.²⁶ Not a complete withdrawal, the British hoped to receive the support of the UN while retaining their leadership role in the region. In fact, it was perceived the British "did not intend to carry out any decision of which they did not approve," and that they "would not participate in enforcing any solution in Palestine that was not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews."²⁷ Notwithstanding the British, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed and comprised of eleven ostensibly neutral nations.²⁸ UNSCOP was tasked with the unenviable undertaking of crafting and enforcing a peace plan in Palestine that would suit the expectations of the Arabs and Jews while also satisfying the interests of a world newly divided by ideology. To be sure, the Cold War would take a difficult task and make it nigh on impossible.

When the Palestine issue was deferred to the UN, the *Yishuv* instinctively looked to the United States as its superpower benefactor, for the Soviet Union had a tendency to oppose Zionism. Both Lenin and Trotsky had been outspoken in their censure of the

²⁶ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 98-9. This news was not wholly good for the Zionists, for in the UN the Arab nations had seven votes, along with the expected sympathy of other Muslim nations. Furthermore, the *Yishuv* could never quite be sure what position the Soviets, who had a long and complicated relationship with the Jewish people, would take. The Jewish Agency, though, did win the right to represent their case in the UN.

²⁷ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 210.

²⁸ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 99. Those nations were Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Peru, Guatemala, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Iran, and India.

movement and labeled it reactionary.²⁹ Lenin's successor Stalin initially adhered to anti-Zionism, but World War II and the Cold War would sway his thoughts.³⁰ Prior to the Second World War Stalin had voiced his support of the Arabs, matching Hitler's sentiments as the two were initially allies. With the Nazi betrayal of 1941 came a swift reversal of Middle Eastern policy – the Arabs now represented the enemy and the *Yishuv* became the ally. More importantly though, the Soviets were quick to notice Great Britain's floundering in the post-war period and recognized it as their opportunity to assert themselves in the Middle East.³¹ As such, their uncharacteristic stance on the Palestine issue would take everyone by surprise.

On May 14, 1947 the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrei Gromyko, announced the Soviet Union's support for the "aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State."³² Moreover, while the Soviets favored a binational state in Palestine, they understood such might not be possible, leading them to suggest the notion of a UN sanctioned partition plan.³³ Regardless of their motivations, the Soviets' sharp reversal of policy was welcome news to the *Yishuv*. Not only did it mean the support of

²⁹ J. Goldstein, "The Attitude of the Jewish and the Russian Intelligentsia to Zionism in the Initial Period (1897-1904)," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 64, no. 4 (October, 1986): 546-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4209355> (accessed October 20, 2014).

³⁰ Bernard D. Weinryb, "Stalin's Zionism," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 46/47, Jubilee Volume (1928-29 / 1978-79) [Part 2] (1978-1980): 556-59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3622371> (accessed October 20, 2014). Weinryb contends that the anti-Zionism of the Bolsheviks was based on two issues: 1) their belief in it being a "nationalistic bourgeois movement" and 2) their political interests in the Middle East, e.g. warm water access and Russia's tricky relationship with the Turks. These two issues being constantly frustrated by Britain's dominion in the region, including Palestine, Zionism took on an imperialist sheen which grated the Soviets to no end.

³¹ Weinryb, "Stalin's Zionism," 564-72.

³² Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 215.

³³ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 215-16. Walter Bedell Smith, America's Ambassador to the USSR, explained the shocking revelation in a way similar to Weinryb's argument. He said the Soviets "hoped that a new Jewish state in Palestine would be the vehicle by which they could eliminate British influence in the Middle East."

an influential superpower, it also meant the United States, supremely mindful of their Cold War interests, would be loath to object. To be sure, with the Cold War in full flight by this time, UNSCOP's decision would undoubtedly be intertwined with the expectations of the two superpowers.

In the summer of 1947, UNSCOP traveled to Palestine in order to survey the situation and hear expert testimony. Returning to Geneva to commence their deliberations, the committee drafted their solution to the Palestine problem. Much like Chaim Weizmann and Aaron Aaronsohn thirty years earlier, Aubrey (Abba) Eban and David Horowitz – Jewish liaisons to the UN – nervously sat waiting as foreign powers decided the fate of the *Yishuv*. When a UN official emerged from the chambers and said, “Oh, here are the expectant fathers,” both men relaxed.³⁴ The news was good. UNSCOP had unanimously voted to terminate the British Mandate and partition Palestine between the Arabs and Jews. Much more favorable than previous partition plans, UNSCOP's recommendation granted the Jews sixty-two percent of the territory, including most of the Negev. Jerusalem would remain an international zone with the rest of the country divided into six sections – three Jewish and three Arab. The Jewish Agency accepted the plan while the Arabs rejected it wholeheartedly with the assurance of war. Regardless, UNSCOP's recommendations were forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which would be responsible for making the final decision.³⁵

³⁴ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 101.

³⁵ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 101-02. The British response to UNSCOP's partition plan was noncommittal at best. They retained their uncooperative stance as the plan was not acceptable to *both* Jews and Arabs. Of course, such a plan being devised was nothing less than a pipe dream by this point.

The UNSCOP report stalled in the mire of bureaucratic hierarchy, and for almost three months the world continued to ponder the Palestine issue. While the Soviets had advertised their stance earlier in the year, a rift between Truman and the State Department left the US position unclear. The latter, desirous of placating the Arab world, suggested the creation of a trusteeship instead of partition.³⁶ The fact that this plan hardly differed from the Mandatory system seemed not to matter, but for Truman the issue was not so simple. Feeling the pressure of Jewish expectation, as well as international and Cold War concerns, Truman wavered for a time before refining his position in October of 1947, when he officially endorsed the partition plan.³⁷ It is difficult to tell who was more displeased with the announcement – the U.S. State Department or the Arabs.

All the hopes and dreams of the *Yishuv*, after decades of struggle and uncertainty, came down to the final vote of the UN General Assembly, which would decide whether or not the Jews would have territory of their own in Palestine. On November 29, 1947 the ballot was cast with the final tally being thirty-three to thirteen with eleven abstentions, including Great Britain.³⁸ Thus, UNGA Resolution 181 divided the region of Palestine between the Arabs and Jews (see Appendix A, Figure 3). The British Mandate would be terminated no later than August 1, 1948, religious rights for all would be protected, the holy sites preserved, and the city of Jerusalem internationalized.³⁹

³⁶ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 252.

³⁷ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 260. Truman is remembered to have “instructed the State Department to support the partition plan.”

³⁸ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 292-95.

³⁹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan), November 29, 1947,”

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20assembly%20resolution%20181.aspx> (accessed October 4, 2011). Though unable to adequately dissect the intricacies of the partition plan here, it is important to at least note the general plan for territorial allotment. The Jews were given

When news of the decision reached Palestine, the revelry was tremendous in Jerusalem where Jews flooded the streets to dance and celebrate.⁴⁰ David Ben-Gurion, for his part, was both elated and circumspect. In his memoirs he wrote, “In Palestine and in the Diaspora the resolution was greeted with wild enthusiasm, by Zionists and non-Zionists alike, by the pious and the non-observant, by the right and by the left. While rejoicing seized the whole House of Israel, there were deep anxieties in my own heart.”⁴¹ His reserve was understandable as he remembered well the Arab assurances of war; assurances they would make good on.⁴²

War would come swiftly as the first shots were fired not twenty-four hours later. Though the *Haganah* had been diligent in their preparation, they were nonetheless grossly outmanned and outgunned by the Arabs of Palestine, who enjoyed the benefaction of the Arab League.⁴³ The dearth of materiel was due in large part to strict

control of the Negev in the south, the northern portion of the coastline including the port city of Haifa, and the region of Galilee. The Arabs were to oversee the southern portion of the coast around Gaza, a segment on the border of Lebanon, and the historical regions of Judea and Samaria surrounding Jerusalem.

⁴⁰ Hannah Hurnard, *Watchmen on the Walls: An Eyewitness Account of Israel's Fight for Independence from the Journal of Hannah Hurnard* (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1997), 8-9.

Medical missionary Hannah Hurnard records the scene from Jerusalem in her journal: “What a scene it was! Every car and bus was packed inside and out with rejoicing revelers. They sat, three or four astride the hoods of the cars and four or five on the roofs, so that the overlaiden vehicles could only crawl forward inch by inch, or, unable to move at all, remained stationary in the middle of the road, thus adding to the congestion and confusion. The few policemen on point duty evidently realized their impotence... [n]one of the officials seemed to have realized the delirious joy the Proclamation of Partition was to evoke in the hearts of the Jewish people, and so they were unprepared to cope with the situation.”

⁴¹ David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: Years of Challenge* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 28. Perhaps the most recognizable Israeli historical figure, Ben-Gurion was the country's first Prime Minister.

⁴² Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no. 1 (Autumn, 1997): 9, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537806> (accessed October 04, 2011). Reflecting the predominant Arab sentiment in the wake of the UNGA decision, Khalidi writes fifty years later, “No, the UN 1947 partition was not the legal, moral, fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable ‘compromise’ formula that it is made out to be. That it was legal at all is moot.” To say the question of partition can still be labeled as a proverbial “hot-button issue” would be a gross understatement.

⁴³ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 70-4. Munitions were so scarce for the *Haganah* that “oranges and potatoes stuffed with detonators served as dummy hand grenades.” In training, “the most solemn moment

British oversight, but organization proved to be more important than bullets. “The difference in outlook between the leaders of the two communities might be summed up as: Palestinian leaders tended to assume that the people depended upon them... whereas Zionist leaders knew that they depended upon their people,” which led to “strong group solidarity.”⁴⁴ This lack of unity would ultimately injure the Arab cause, but not without first inflicting damage on the *Yishuv*.

For the British, the UN’s partition scheme was loathsome to the extreme. Spurned and realizing the deterioration of their Empire, the Mandatory government made a point to align itself more clearly with the Arab factions as they believed a Jewish state would be less than friendly to British interests. To this end, they announced they would “forcibly maintain [their] restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine until [they] left.”⁴⁵ Ben-Gurion complained the Mandate “prove[d] itself ineffectual” as it stood idly by when Arab violence broke out against the Jews.⁴⁶ Whether purposeful collusion or simply a case of wounded pride⁴⁷, the British remained decidedly stoic during the ensuing

in a recruit’s rifle course often came when he was given a single round to fire as a kind of graduation present.”

⁴⁴ John Gee, *Unequal Conflict: The Palestinians and Israel* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 34.

Agreeing with Gee, historian and former Senior Information Officer at the Council for Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, Collins and Lapierre discuss the Arab hierarchical structure on page 74 of *O Jerusalem!*: “...the prime requisite for membership was allegiance to the Mufti, and it was the clans, tribes and villages whose loyalty was already well established that were called on to furnish its manpower. Unlike the Haganah with its deep roots in the Jewish community, the Mufti’s warriors were a kind of private army whose function was as much to remind Palestine’s Arab community who their leader was as it was to fight the Jews.”

⁴⁵ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 84-5. Between 1946 and 1948, the British “intercepted forty-seven shiploads of illegal immigrants, interning 65,307 illegal immigrants in their detention camps on the island of Cyprus.”

⁴⁶ Ben-Gurion, *Israel: Years of Challenge*, 32.

⁴⁷ Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine*, 160-61. Hanna, writing in 1942, contends the ultimate failure of the British Mandate and subsequent violence might all have been avoided had the British behaved differently: “If the British government had been able, in the years immediately following the First World War, to overcome the pressure impelling it to compromise, two alternatives would have presented themselves: firm action in the original spirit of the Balfour Declaration, or repudiation of the pledge to the Jews as

Jewish War of Independence, even as the violence compounded and the date of their withdrawal, now set for May 15, 1948, drew ever nearer.⁴⁸

The Jews, though, had more urgent matters than international diplomacy to which to attend. The Arab onslaught was quickly gaining speed, putting the *Haganah* on the defensive. For the *Yishuv*, the community most crucial to their survival was that of Jerusalem. It was also their most vulnerable, a fact well-known by the Arabs. As such, the siege of Jerusalem began with a vengeance in December of 1947, when Arab forces narrowed their focus to the weakest link of the *Yishuv* – the one road connecting the one-hundred thousand Jews of Jerusalem to the outside world. “Forty-five miles long, rising from sea level to 2,500 feet, it was the artery leading to the men, women and children who represented the largest, most important Jewish settlement in Palestine,”⁴⁹ and the “one place where all Ben-Gurion’s hopes could be shattered by a single decisive blow.”⁵⁰ Whether via snipers or blockades, Arab forces effectively stymied most all Jewish movement in and out of Jerusalem and thereby threatened the very existence of the *Yishuv*.⁵¹

impracticable... It is conceivable that a firm and consistent fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration might have put down Arab opposition in Palestine while the movement was still not fully organized and the fellahin were apathetic... On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the repudiation of the Balfour Declaration would have permitted the creation of an Arab state linked to Great Britain by a military alliance and fairly amenable to British influence.” Such as it was, neither occurred and the imagined outcomes never came to be.

⁴⁸ Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 295-96. The UNGA created a special Palestine commission to oversee the transfer of authority from the Mandate. Composed of delegates from Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines, the commission desired the British withdraw as soon as possible, but they remained uncooperative. In fact, when the commission arrived unannounced in January 1947, the British went to great lengths to make them feel markedly unwelcome.

⁴⁹ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 61.

⁵⁰ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 80.

⁵¹ Hurnard, *Watchmen on the Walls*, 24. Hurnard recalls a rather amusing anecdote of a journalist attempting to move from the Arab sector of Jerusalem into the Jewish. “In order to do this, he drove from the Old City to Transjordan. From there he flew to Syria, then on to Cyprus and Italy, and from thence by

The *Yishuv* petitioned the British to intervene, but they were denied. A compromise was offered: Britain would escort supply convoys – searched and stripped of arms and ammunition – into Jerusalem on the condition that any Jew desirous to leave the city be allowed to do so, not to return again.⁵² This arrangement was unpopular as the *Yishuv's* position in Jerusalem was critical.⁵³ As such, the *Haganah* devised Operation *Nachshon*, a strategy to contravene the British and break through the Arab blockade. Hoping to safely move three thousand tons of food into Jerusalem, the *Haganah* looked to divert Arab forces to Ramla in order to commandeer the blockades at Kastel and Bab el Wad. The plan worked as convoys successfully broke through to bring food to a starving Jerusalem in April of 1948.⁵⁴ More importantly, though, Operation *Nachshon* was a critical victory for the *Yishuv* as the survival of their Jerusalem community was ensured and promised to last through the remainder of the Mandate.

The War of Independence was not without its share of tragedies, though. While Operation *Nachshon* was in full-swing under the watchful eye of the *Haganah*, the fringe *Stern* and *Irgun* gangs, whose extremism carried with it a propensity for wanton violence, were raiding the Arab village of Deir Yassin. An estimated two hundred Arab civilians

air to Haifa. From Haifa he went to Tel Aviv by car, then up the so-called 'Burma Road' and so back into the Jewish side of Jerusalem. This was a journey that in the ordinary way he could have accomplished by boarding a bus at Jaffa Gate and alighting two minutes later, higher up the street in the middle of the Jewish shopping center."

⁵² Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 134.

⁵³ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 60-1. Displaying wise forethought, the *Haganah* understood the importance of proper preparation for British withdrawal, and thusly they developed Plan *Dalet*, or Plan D. Anticipating a power vacuum in Britain's wake, they arranged for each Jewish settlement to protect itself until Jewish forces could arrive. For this to work, the *Haganah* had to ensure the integrity of all roadways, most notably that connecting Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. Were there to be a weakened community in Jerusalem, the situation would be dire, if not hopeless.

⁵⁴ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 113-14; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 252-59.

were killed in the attack⁵⁵, and though the Jewish Agency quickly condemned the incident, the damage had been done. The inhumane slaughter of women and children threatened the image of Zionism in the eyes of the world, or so the Arabs hoped. They were quick to exploit the reports of Deir Yassin for propaganda purposes, but the long-term results of their campaign would have an outcome much the reverse of their expectations.⁵⁶

Fueled by the success of Operation *Nachshon*, the *Haganah* was making quick work of securing villages throughout the countryside before the imminent British withdrawal. Cognizant of the threat of war with multiple Arab armies after May 15, they were scurrying to solidify their position. For the most part, the areas targeted by the Jews were within the UN's designated Jewish region, but they possessed large Arab populations. Cities like Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, and Jaffa fell quickly to the *Haganah*, with most Arabs choosing to flee the Jewish advance.⁵⁷ For most, the ghastly memories of Deir Yassin propagated by the Arabs fueled their flight. Unfortunately, most all believed their absence would be short-lived. Ben Zion Inbar, a *Haganah* commander in Haifa, remembers discussing terms of surrender with the Arabs there, who preferred to leave instead. They asked them to stay, "but it was useless, because the mufti [*sic*] had promised them that after ten days all the Arab countries would invade and the inhabitants would get back not only their own houses but the Jews' as well, not to mention all

⁵⁵ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 115.

⁵⁶ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 283-97. In the immediate aftermath of the Deir Yassin attack, the Arabs sought their vengeance in an equally mercenary manner. On April 13, 1945, a medical convoy headed towards Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus was waylaid by Arab forces. With shouts of "Deir Yassin!" the attackers slew at least seventy-five. More devastating to the *Yishuv* than the human loss was British indifference – the *Haganah* was warned they would be shot down if they intervened.

⁵⁷ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 281; 336-37.

women and other ‘spoils.’ Therefore, they refused to surrender and left, all but about twenty-five hundred who remained out of sixty thousand.”⁵⁸ The compound belief in Jewish nefariousness and Arab predominance led countless Arabs to flee their homes, and the Jews moved in.⁵⁹ The stage, it seemed, was set for the imminent dissolution of the British Mandate.

For David Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency, the time had come to prepare a plan for post-Mandate Palestine. Uncertain of America’s position – Truman and the State Department remained at odds – and wary of the Soviet Union’s newfound support of Zionism, the decision was difficult. Nine members of the National Administration, a newly established provisional government, met in Tel Aviv to decide their course of action. Conscious of their need for materiel in order to compete with the Arab armies – American Secretary of State George Marshall gave the *Haganah* a fifty percent chance of victory – the attendees contemplated a deferred declaration of statehood in order to negotiate a truce. Putting the issue to vote, four voted for a postponement. With the monumental motion losing by a single vote, the decision was made to declare statehood immediately, despite the guarantee of war. Making allowances for the dictates of

⁵⁸ Lynne Reid Banks, *Torn Country: An Oral History of the Israeli War of Independence* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), 116-17. Banks, journalist stationed in Israel, records another account, this one of Shmuel Toledano who was present for the capture of Jaffa: “It was an extraordinary thing. For a Jew to enter Jaffa till then had been extremely dangerous – it was an all-Arab town, 70,000 inhabitants. But when we entered Jaffa and conquered it in April 1948 we found an almost empty town containing only about 4,000 Arabs... there were rumors, based on the Etzel’s [*Irgun*’s] reputation – many Arabs were under the impression the minute the Jews entered the town, the inhabitants would all be slaughtered.” 123-25.

⁵⁹ Gee, *Unequal Conflict*, 57. John Gee contends the Jews exploited the situation for selfish gain: “Well over half of the Palestinian Arab people had been consigned to perpetual exile from their homes by Israel. In spite of all they had feared from Zionism from their firsthand knowledge of it, they found it hard to believe that such a wrong could have been done to them.” Perhaps justified to some extent, this position fails to take into consideration the role of the Arab leadership who so cleverly propagated the idea of a cruel and malicious Jewish fighting force. They played no small part in encouraging widespread Arab withdrawal.

Sabbath observance, it was settled that the new Jewish state, Israel, would be born at four o'clock in the afternoon on Friday, May 14, 1948 (fifth day of Iyar, 5708 according to the Hebrew calendar).⁶⁰

For President Truman, the impending declaration brought with it a whole host of trouble. Weary from his unending battle with the State Department – in March, without Truman's knowledge, they declared U.S. policy favored the idea of trusteeship rather than partition⁶¹ – and conscious of the delicate balance required in the new world order, Truman was in an unenviable position. However, days before Britain's withdrawal, the President sent word to Chaim Weizmann, with whom he had been in contact that "he would recognize the Jewish state as soon as it was proclaimed."⁶² In true Cold War fashion, the next priority was to do so before the Soviets.⁶³

Purportedly in favor of a Jewish state, the Soviets were still regarded with reservation as they were traditionally capricious. Since the partitioning of Poland during the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia's relationship with the Jewish people had been

⁶⁰ Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 350-57. The group subsequently drafted their declaration of independence, which did not limit its boundaries to those dictated by the UN, but rather the *de facto* situation on the ground. Additionally, they selected the name Israel for their new country – Zion being the other contender.

⁶¹ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 301-03. On March 19, Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, informed the Security Council that America liked the idea of a trusteeship of Palestine being created under the umbrella of the UN. Truman, upon finding out, wrote in his diary: "This morning I find that the State Dept. has reversed my Palestine policy. The first I know about it is what I see in the papers! I am now in the position of a liar and a double-crosser. I've never felt so in my life. There are people on the third and fourth levels of the State Dept. who have always wanted to cut my throat. They've succeeded in doing it."

⁶² Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 319.

⁶³ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 325. Dean Rusk of the State Department "thought that if the Soviets recognized the Jewish state, as it was contemplating doing, it would allow them to come to the new state's defense if it were attacked by the Arabs. In light of this, Rusk thought that the United States had better be prepared to take a position once the new Jewish state was proclaimed."

fraught with misconception, distrust, and even violence.⁶⁴ Though the Bolsheviks, who defined themselves as “protectors of the weak and oppressed, and as fighters against the enemies of social justice and national equality,” offered a glimmer of hope to Russian Jewry, wariness reigned still.⁶⁵ Yet, in the Holocaust’s wake, the Soviets were curiously benevolent towards the idea of a Jewish state. As both a Cold War power and a source of the *Yishuv*’s most precious resource – Jewish immigrants, Soviet solidarity was critical.⁶⁶

The time for a new era had come. Thirty years after General Allenby’s triumphant march into Jerusalem, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end, and at long last, the centuries-old yearning of the Jews for home was being fulfilled. It was exactly four o’clock on Friday when David Ben-Gurion ascended the stage to usher in a Jewish state. Packed into a small Tel Aviv museum, the few Jews fortunate enough to

⁶⁴ The partitioning of Poland occurred in three stages between 1772 and 1795. Prior to this, Jews and Russians were rather unfamiliar with each other, but as Poland boasted 900,000 Jews, they quickly became acquainted – at least from a distance. The Pale of Settlement was established, wherein Jews were confined to their *shtetl*’s in a swathe of territory just to the west of Russia proper. Overt Russian anti-Semitism did not rear its ugly head until 1881 with the outbreak of *pogroms*, a prominent stimulus for the burgeoning Zionist movement. For a deeper discussion of this era, see *Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the “Jewish Question” in Russia, 1772-1825* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986) and *Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question, 1855-1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), both by John Doyle Klier, or Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern’s *The Golden Age Shtetl: A New History of Jewish Life in East Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

⁶⁵ Harvey Asher, “The Soviet Union, the Holocaust, and Auschwitz,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4, no. 4 (Fall, 2003): 889. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kri/summary/v004/4.4asher.html> (accessed November 6, 2014). While it is true that communism theoretically rejected anti-Semitism, it did not prove amenable to Zionism. As a nationalist movement, Zionism threatened the unity of Russia so prized by the Bolsheviks. That being the case, within the Soviet system there were instances of anti-Semitism – though not state-sponsored. Images popularizing the idea of inherent Jewish physical characteristics were circulated during the 1920s, and though directed towards *Judaism* and not *Jews*, they nonetheless resulted in the concept of the Jewish people being an ethno-racial group rather than merely religious. For more, see Robert Weinberg’s “Demonizing Judaism in the Soviet Union during the 1920s,” *Slavic Review* 67, no. 1 (Spring, 2008), 120-153.

⁶⁶ Benjamin Pinkus, “Change and Continuity in Soviet Policy towards Soviet Jewry and Israel, May-December 1948,” *Israel Studies* 10, no. 1 (Spring, 2005): 98-102. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/is/summary/v010/10.1pinkus.html> (accessed November 6, 2014). The issue of immigration would prove thorny as the Soviet Union was disinclined to permit mass emigration of Soviet Jews, though the Soviet bloc was more amenable to the idea, at least initially.

witness the event looked upon a portrait of Theodor Herzl as Ben-Gurion formally announced the creation of an independent Jewish state:

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel⁶⁷; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to make such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.

This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

Accordingly we, members of the People's Council, Representatives of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.⁶⁸

Signed by twenty-five leaders of the new state of Israel, the declaration opened the borders of Israel to all immigrants, thereby negating the White Paper, and expressed the

⁶⁷ Hebrew – “Land of Israel”

⁶⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel: May 14, 1948,” <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx> (accessed October 4, 2011).

desire to exist peacefully with their Arab neighbors. Though the latter would prove impossible, Jewish revelry on this day could not be suppressed.⁶⁹

Despite fierce objections from the State Department, President Truman announced America's recognition of the new state only minutes after midnight Israeli time (as the British Mandate officially ended at 12:00) on May 15, 1948.⁷⁰ Beating the Soviets, the United States offered *de facto* recognition only.⁷¹ Three days later, the Soviet Union granted Israel *de jure* recognition, along with the statement asserting the "Soviet Government hopes that the establishment of the sovereign independent state of the Jewish people will serve to strengthen peace and security in Palestine and the Near East, and it expresses its faith in the development of friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the State of Israel."⁷² Other nations of the communist bloc raced to offer their acknowledgement after the Soviets, but both Britain and France tarried until January of 1949.⁷³

For the Arabs, though, May 14th was not a day of celebration, but rather of mourning. Christened the *Nakba* (Arabic for catastrophe), this day in history would

⁶⁹ Ben-Gurion, *Israel: Years of Challenge*, 41-4. Recalling May 14th, Ben-Gurion writes that, much like on November 29, 1947, his heart was heavy in spite of the historic occasion. This was because, just two hours prior to his speech, the *Haganah* informed him that five Arab armies – Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq – stood ready to invade as soon as British High Commissioner Sir Alan Cunningham departed. They did just that.

⁷⁰ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 338.

⁷¹ Radosh and Radosh, *A Safe Haven*, 336-37; 344. The specification of *de facto* simply indicated that America acknowledged "the Jewish state existed, that the new government could carry out its international obligations, and the country's inhabitants accepted its government." The alternative, *de jure*, would suggest the government and boundaries of Israel were recognized as permanent. This status would not be granted until January 31, 1949.

⁷² Pinkus, "Change and Continuity in Soviet Policy towards Soviet Jewry and Israel, May-December 1948," 96.

⁷³ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 372-76. Pride wounded, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin urged all British territories to withhold recognition. A Foreign Office spokesman is quoted as saying, "There's no need to hurry. There is no election in this country until 1950."

represent a festering wound for the Arab people, fomenting their resolve to invalidate and expel Israel. Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, General Secretary of the Arab League, quickly declared war between the Arab nations and the Jews of Israel.⁷⁴ Though the conflict between Arab and Jew would prove long-lasting and costly, it would not be impetus of discord in the region. Rather, manipulated and exploited by the Cold War, the regional clash would become an international issue awash with ideological rhetoric and politicization. As before, though both the Arabs and Jews were seemingly given at least a modicum of autonomy, true independence would be forfeited to foreign interference and maneuvering. And much like before, neither wanted nor asked for it.

⁷⁴ Postal and Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy*, 384.

SECTION II: THE ANTI-ZIONIST MOVEMENT IN CONTEXT

Chapter III:

Prejudice Meets Politics

In the Middle East, the political effects of the Second World War were both painfully evident and long-lasting. The imperial system's dissolution was swift and profound, and the birth of Israel, riding on the coattails of the Holocaust, was euphoric for the Jewish people. The Arab world had a completely different perspective and would contest the state's creation repeatedly as the new political and demographic realities took shape. Conflict and the threat of conflict, though, were not the only problems the new state faced. To wit, the Holocaust had proved to be far more Janus-faced than originally supposed. The obvious implications of Hitler's regime were embodied in the horrors of the death camps, but rather less clear was the transition from the prejudice of old into a new form that was far more pernicious. Tossing aside the question of religion, Hitler's regime promoted and exploited the nascent concept of a Jewish race. By popularizing the notion of a racialized Jew, Hitler fashioned him into a relevant and easily identifiable

foe.¹ Though these ideas would be harshly condemned after the war, the paranoia of the Cold War would necessitate a similar transformation.² Indeed, the Soviet Union, responding to both internal and external pressures, would utilize the template left behind by the Nazis, applying it to their own unique form of anti-Semitism. Initially slapdash, the process would eventually transform anti-Semitism into a modern and effective Cold War weapon.

For centuries the Jewish people had been made to wear the mantle of pariah. The Christian Church regularly rebuked the Jews for an array of evils ranging from usury, to the blood libel, and finally to the greatest of all sins – deicide, a sin that would not be erased until the 1965 Second Vatican Council.³ This assortment of anti-Semitic charges was overwhelmingly religious in nature, and not until the dawn of the twentieth century

¹ Attempting to delineate between “ethnicity” and “race”, Eric D. Weitz argues that the former is “defined by shared customs based on a belief in common descent.” Conversely, “Race is the ‘hardest’ and most exclusive form of identity. Race is present when a defined population group is seen to have particular characteristics that are indelible, immutable, and transgenerational. Race is fate; there is no escape from the characteristics that are said to be carried by every single member of the group bar none... Hence, ethnic groups, nationalities, and even social classes can be ‘racialized’ in historically contingent moments and places... While ethnicity is often self-defined... racial categorizations are most often assigned to a group by an outside power.” Eric D. Weitz, “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges,” *Slavic Review* 61, no. 1 (Spring, 2002), 6-7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696978> (accessed October 7, 2016).

² United States Department of State, “Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism: A Report Provided to the United States Congress,” 32. According to the State Department, “Traditional anti-Semitism, with its historic linkage to Nazism and fascism, tends to be overt and is considered unacceptable and illegitimate by much of the mainstream in Western Europe, North America, and beyond. In contrast, new anti-Semitism, characterized by anti-Zionist and anti-Israel criticism that is anti-Semitic in its effect – whether or not in its intent – is more subtle and thus frequently escapes condemnation.”

³ “Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, *Nostra Aetate*. Proclaimed by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on October 28, 1965,” http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html (accessed June 4, 2016). The *Nostra Aetate* of the Second Vatican Council stated, “True, the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ; still, what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today.” Though by no means a flawless document, it was unquestionably a proverbial step in the right direction.

did it begin to take on a different shape as new racial theories steadily gained attention from both layman and scholar. Hitler, politically savvy, understood this shift and employed it for his own purposes. In line with Joseph Goebbels' belief that anti-Semitism was an "extraordinarily effective means of propaganda,"⁴ Hitler strove to exploit the prejudicial climate by making Judeophobia an issue of race and thereby an immutable distinction.

The Nazis by no means disregarded the inherent potency of religious antipathy, but rather defined it as an "external manifestation of the Jewish racial essence rather than as a faith system that could and should be understood on its own terms."⁵ This allowed them to seamlessly modernize their bigotry in a way that was accessible to all. Concurrently, a scholarly movement arose that highlighted the ancestral background and consequential racial hybridization of the Jewish people, distancing them from the so-called purity of the Aryan race.⁶ Though worthy of further discussion, the tactics of the Nazi machine are not of upmost importance here. Rather, it is the most profound consequence of Nazism's anti-Semitic dogma – its malleability. When identified as a mere religious entity, the Jew possessed the option of conversion and thereby escape. However, when the immutability of the racial stigma was applied, the individual and their descendants were inescapably caught. This innovative anti-Semitism led to the horrors of

⁴ Joseph Goebbels quoted in Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 199. Herf is a professor at the University of Maryland with a background in both history and sociology.

⁵ Alan E. Steinweis, *Studying the Jews: Scholarly Antisemitism in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 18. Historian Steinweis was a finalist for the National Jewish Book Award for this particular book.

⁶ Steinweis, *Studying the Jews*, 25-46. Steinweis pays note to Hans F. K. Günther's 1930 book *Racial Characteristics of the Jewish People*, which discussed the various physical characteristics inherent to all Jews, including a distinct speech pattern, facial characteristics, and even odor.

the Holocaust, and the vestiges of such would boast their durability and provide a template for ensuing prejudice.

For the Soviet Union, which was by no means unacquainted with flashes of anti-Semitism, the definition of the Jewish enemy was historically quite vague. Despite the Judeophobic legacy of the Imperial era, exemplified in the pogroms of the late-nineteenth century and the propagation of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*⁷, the Soviets had been surprisingly amenable to the Jewish people in the early stages of their rule. Not until the late 1930s, when Russian nationalism was on the rise and Stalin began purging the Soviet hierarchy, did overt anti-Semitism reemerge.⁸ Jewish quotas were established, Jewish infrastructure was undermined, and the Soviet “old guard” – primarily composed of Jews – was systematically eradicated.⁹ The Stalin period witnessed additional episodes of anti-Semitism as seen in both the *Birobidzhan* project and the Doctors’ Plot.¹⁰ However, despite these instances of prejudice, anti-Semitism was not central to Soviet policy, but rather a useful, if at times idle tool. In the early stages of the Cold War, Soviet prejudice

⁷ For an imaginative exploration of the sordid history of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, see Will Eisner’s graphic novel *The Plot: The Secret History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005).

⁸ Weitz, “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges,” 20-29. Discussing the influence of German racialism, Weitz maintains that distinctions must be made between the two nations. “Racial ideology, when adopted and practiced by a state, necessarily entails the subordination of defined population groups and includes impulses towards ethnic cleansings and genocides. The absence of such an ideology acted as a brake on the Soviet regime’s population politics, preventing the unfolding of a full-scale genocidal program along the lines of Nazi Germany... The practices of racial politics brought the Soviet Union under Stalin uncomfortably close to the Third Reich, though vital distinctions remained as well.”

⁹ William Korey. “The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis,” *Slavic Review* 31, no. 1 (March, 1972): 116-17. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2494148> (accessed April 29, 2013).

¹⁰ The former was the USSR’s scheme of an autonomous Jewish enclave in far-east Russia as a means of both isolating and appeasing Russian Zionists. The idea ultimately failed. The latter was Stalin’s paranoid belief that Soviet doctors, primarily Jewish, were working to pick off Soviet leaders on the behalf of international Zionism. Thankfully, before an official “trial” could begin, Stalin died and a potential pogrom was avoided.

was strictly limited to internal affairs – they did after all recognize Israel voluntarily. Regrettably, though, the intrinsic jingoism of the Cold War was intoxicating and would eventually create the need for an identifiable and accessible enemy. For Russians, the Jew was an obvious choice.¹¹

The post-war Middle East remained the object of attention much as it had twenty-five years earlier. At the dawn of the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire was ripe for imperial intervention, but by the 1940s those same empires that earlier had expanded into the region were themselves wobbling. Nature abhors a vacuum, and the inevitable vacuity of the region was a veritable tinder box for Cold War conflict. The United States, it was assumed, would align with Israel given Truman's posthaste recognition in 1948, but the Soviets were anything but predictable. When the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) was signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1949, there was a brief period of peace, but instability would be quick to return.¹² Fearing Soviet intervention, the 1950 Tripartite Declaration was agreed to by the governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States, wherein they "declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel."¹³ Five years later the Baghdad Pact

¹¹ Pinkus, "Change and Continuity in Soviet Policy towards Soviet Jewry and Israel, May-December 1948." Pinkus argues that Jewish nationalism within the Soviet Union was stirred by the three key events: 1) the Holocaust, 2) the establishment of Israel, and 3) the Soviet Union's support of Israel. However, overt expression of Jewish nationalism soon troubled Soviet leadership and eventually led them to pursue repression. Consequently it was internal concerns, rather than issues of foreign policy, that would initially fuel their Cold War anti-Jewish policies.

¹² Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Presidio Press, 2002), 8-9. Signed by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, the UN-mediated GAA proved worthless as it failed to even acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel – an issue to this day.

¹³ "Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders: Statement by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 25, 1950," in the Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Library, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/mid001.asp (accessed June 5, 2016). The three countries also stated their "deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance

was signed by Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran, and was in fact designed as a counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – the Pact later came to be known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).¹⁴ The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Security in the Near and Middle East responded to the Pact by saying, “Military blocs in the Near and Middle East are needed, not by the countries of that area, but by those aggressive American circles which are trying to establish dominion there.”¹⁵ They then averred:

Of course, the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the situation arising in the region of the Near and Middle East, since the formation of these blocs and the establishment of foreign military bases on the territory of the countries of the Near and Middle East have a direct bearing on the security of the U.S.S.R. This attitude of the Soviet government should be all the more understandable since the U.S.S.R. is situated very close to these countries – something which cannot be said of other foreign powers, for instance, of the United States, which is thousands of kilometres [*sic*] from this area.”¹⁶

True to their word, the Soviets did not remain indifferent, for later that year they struck a deal of their own with Egypt that greatly discomfited the West.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ushered in an era marked by a more assertive foreign policy. Unnerved by the Baghdad Pact, both

of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area.”

¹⁴ “Pact of Mutual Cooperation between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact), February 24, 1955,” in the Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Library, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/baghdad.asp (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁵ “Statement by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Security in the Near and Middle East, April 16, 1955,” ed. Paul Halsall, in the Modern History Sourcebook, <https://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1955Soviet-baghdad1.asp> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁶ “Statement by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Security in the Near and Middle East.”

Khrushchev and his Egyptian counterpart Gamal Abdel Nasser, an ardent pan-Arabist, signed an arms deal brokered by Czechoslovakia.¹⁷ This signified a departure from tradition for the Soviets, who had never made such a deal with a non-communist country before. Moreover, it stood counter to the goals of the Tripartite Agreement and threatened its idealism. On the heels of the Korean Conflict, a superpower clash in the Middle East was looking ever more probable.

The first real test would come just a year later, when in October of 1956 Israel, at the behest of the French and British, invaded the Sinai Peninsula with the intention of driving the Egyptians out of the Suez Canal zone. Months earlier Nasser had nationalized the canal, an untenable situation for England and France, and as Israel wanted access to the Straits of Tiran, all three colluded in the disastrous scheme.¹⁸ American President Dwight D. Eisenhower, surprisingly deviating from his predecessor, quickly and sternly condemned all three allies.¹⁹ In January he would reference the crisis when unveiling his eponymous Doctrine on the Middle East, which promised America's aid to those looking to repel Russia's "Communizing of the world."²⁰ For the Soviets,

¹⁷ Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 7-10. Glassman worked in the State Department before being named Ambassador to Paraguay by President George H.W. Bush.

¹⁸ Douglas Little, "The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords," in *Crises and Détente*, vol. 2 of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 307-10. Historian Douglas Little is a professor in the Asian Studies program at Clark University.

¹⁹ William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 291. A Public Affairs professor, Inboden's view of Eisenhower's foreign policy via the lens of religion is fascinating. He maintains that the President's close friend and pastor, Rev. Edward Elson, was forceful in his opinions and perceptions of the Middle East. In respect to Israel, Elson touted the idea of containing Israel – much like Kennan's policy for the USSR. According to Inboden, this ideology was one stimulus for Eisenhower's response in 1956.

²⁰ President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, a Message to Congress, January 5, 1957," ed. Paul Halsall, in the Modern History Sourcebook, <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.htm> (accessed June 1, 2016).

the events of 1956 merely strengthened their commitment to Nasser, who saw the Crisis as further evidence of the West's imperialism. More importantly, though, 1956 fits notably into the broader timeline of Soviet-Israeli relations.

The 1950s represented an evolution of the USSR's Middle Eastern policy. Two years before striking a deal with Nasser, the Soviets had cut diplomatic ties with Israel. This was a sharp turn from their stance in 1948, when they were quick to support the Zionist home. Five years later, when the British had little semblance of power left in the region, and the need for an ally in Israel was diminished, the Soviets hedged their bets on the Arabs. The decision to cut ties makes more sense when considering internal Soviet factors – historian William Korey theorizes the move “was far less because of foreign policy considerations than because of the need to justify an internal policy that required Israel, in the guise of Zionism, to be portrayed as an enemy.”²¹ This argument is valid and underscores a crucial development in Soviet anti-Semitic rhetoric – breaking ties gave Israel enemy status and pushed it into closer relationship with the West. As such, the term “Zionist”, far more ambiguous than “Jew”, could be used as a blanket label applicable to both internal and external (i.e. Cold War) issues. So, as the Soviets were

²¹ William Korey, “The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis,” *Slavic Review* 31, no. 1 (March, 1972):111-35, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2494148> (accessed October 20, 2014), 126. Recall that 1953 was the climactic year of the so-called Doctors' Plot, the epitome of increased anti-Semitism *within* the Soviet Union; Polish historian Dariusz Stola, in “Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967-1968,” *The Journal of Israeli History* 25, vol. 1 (March, 2006), 177, argues that the 1952 show trial of Rudolf Slánský in Czechoslovakia “introduced ‘anti-Zionism’ into the official vocabularies of communist regimes as a code name for any anti-Jewish speech and action. The terms *Zionism* and *Zionist* no longer denoted Jewish nationalism, which the Communists, including Jewish Communists, had long opposed, but became labels to be freely applied to any person of Jewish origin whom the regime targeted for attack.”

strengthening ties with the Arab world, they were concomitantly creating a new Cold War enemy. This enemy was Zionism.

More conveniently, the Soviets' Arab allies were already fighting this Middle Eastern enemy. In the Arab world, mention of the Holocaust unavoidably evoked images of the *Nakba*, or catastrophe epitomized in the 1948 birth of Israel. Indeed, it was often argued that the Arabs were unjustly saddled with the responsibility for the Jews that rightly belonged to those who failed to prevent the genocide. This only served to deepen anti-West and anti-Jewish sentiment within the Arab world – both sentiments encouraged by the Soviets.²² Consequently, a widespread verbal conflagration arose that sought to either minimize or flatly deny the Holocaust, thereby delegitimizing Israel.²³ The bitterness was kept alive and fresh throughout the ensuing decades as Germany offered reparation payments to Israel, Adolf Eichmann was captured and tried, and the Vatican exculpated the Jews of the crime of deicide. While Israel found legitimacy through such actions, the grievances of the past were remembered by the Arabs and the consequent derogatory rhetoric was perpetuated.²⁴ Claims of Zionist-Nazi collusion, denial or

²² Gilbert Achcar, *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives*, translated by G.M. Goshgarian (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009), 50. Lebanese-born Achcar, professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, repeatedly makes the contention that Israel would not have been born had it not been for the Holocaust. A reasonable and certainly understandable position, it is nonetheless overly simplistic – there were *many* factors at play in 1948.

²³ Meir Litvak and Esther Webman, *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 36, 376-78. Litvak and Webman, both of the Moshe Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University, argue that this created an uncomfortable dichotomy, because if the Holocaust was ever acknowledged, the state of Israel, long painted as the direct consequence of such, would then be legitimized as well.

²⁴ For a deeper examination of this timeline, see both *The Arabs and the Holocaust* and *From Empathy to Denial* as they both come from opposite sides of the spectrum. Additionally, Tom Segev's *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1991) is a real *tour de force* on how the *Yishuv* (Jewish community in pre-state Israel) experienced and responded to the Holocaust and its aftermath.

justification of the Holocaust, and the conflation of the terms “Jew” and “Zionist” became commonplace during this period,²⁵ a fact of which the Soviet Union was aware and all too willing to exploit for its own political gain.²⁶

When Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits of Tiran in May of 1967, a major Middle Eastern war was all but guaranteed. No one expected it to happen quite as it did. Surprising everyone with a pre-emptive strike in the early morning hours of June 5, Israel decimated Egypt’s air force. By June 10 they had claimed the Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Gaza, and most importantly, East Jerusalem. In short, it was a stunning Israeli victory.²⁷ Not only were Israel’s Arab neighbors soundly defeated, but the Soviet Union, whom everyone knew had supplied and backed said countries, was thoroughly embarrassed.²⁸ The Soviets had hoped to capitalize on Nasser’s commitment to aggression in order to subvert Israel, and more indirectly Western influence in the Middle East – this at a time when the United States was focused on the ever-growing Vietnam War.²⁹ Thwarted, the Soviets felt keenly their failure and

²⁵ Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 17-23. According to historian Lewis, a Jew is to be defined as per rabbinic law – as one either born to a Jewish mother or an official convert to Judaism. Zionism for its part is defined as a political movement. Lewis’ succinct summation of the issue is important: “It would be palpably unjust, even absurd, to assert that all critics or opponents of Zionism or Israel are moved by anti-Semitism; it would be equally mistaken to deny that anti-Zionism can on occasion provide a cloak of respectability for a prejudice which, at the present time, and in the free world, is not normally admitted in public by anyone with political ambitions or cultural pretensions.”

²⁶ Litvak and Webman, *From Empathy to Denial*, 44-5, 112-13, 116, 137, 155-57, and 207; for Achcar’s response to these claims, see *The Arabs and Holocaust* 177-82.

²⁷ For a comprehensive analysis of the so-called Six-Day War, see Michael B. Oren’s magisterial *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Presidio Press, 2002).

²⁸ Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 22-64. Glassman itemizes the materiel and training supplied by the Soviets to Egypt and Syria. Moreover, he stresses that poor planning on the Soviet’s part, especially in the area of air defense, proved crucial to the swift Israeli victory. They seemed neither willing to completely withdraw from or commit to the growing tension in the region – a poor choice in the end.

²⁹ Kenny Kolander, in his article “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?” *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.3 (January, 2016), makes the compelling argument that the Soviet Union’s purposes

immediately looked to recoup their losses via peace talks – the consequent UN Resolution 242 would institute the “land for peace” principle still being advocated today.³⁰ Beneath this sheen of goodwill, though, the Soviet Union was nursing a bruised ego. Staunchly proud and aware of the importance of perception in the Cold War world, the battle against Zionism would intensify a hundredfold.³¹

Impressive in its breadth and perniciousness, the Soviet anti-Zionist movement was not selective in its medium or lexicon. As William Korey attests, Zionism was “equated with every conceivable evil – racism, imperialism, capitalist exploitation, colonialism, militarism, crime, murder, espionage, terrorism, prostitution, even Hitlerism.”³² As the Nazis had transmuted the religious Jew into the racial, so the Soviets transformed a political term – Zionism – into the unqualified ideal of evil. On the heels

for this war were decidedly Cold War oriented – they hoped to underscore American favoritism towards Israel, thereby strengthening their own relationship with the Arabs. In short, “...to use the heightened tensions in the region to paint a picture of USA-Israeli collusion in order to undermine relations with Arab states.”

³⁰ U.N., Security Council, Resolution 242, 1967, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136> (accessed June 1, 2016). This November 22nd resolution called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” in exchange for the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

³¹ Dariusz Stola, “The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland in 1968,” Central European University, Jewish Studies Program, Public Lecture 2000-2001, 4-5. Polish historian and the director of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews, Stola speaks of the post-1967 anti-Zionist rhetoric encouraged by the Soviets and issued by Polish leadership. In a June 19, 1967 speech, Władysław Gomułka claimed that “Israel’s aggression in the Arab countries met with applause in Zionist circles of Jews – Polish citizens,” before warning of the likely emergence of a “fifth column.” Effectively making a Middle East war relevant to the Polish people, Poland witnessed Jewish purges within both social and military spheres. The outbreak of student riots the following year was blamed on Zionists, leading to Zionist witch-hunts that resulted in increased Jewish emigration – about half of the total Jewish diaspora in Poland.

³² William Korey, *Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism*, Studies in Antisemitism 2 (London: Routledge, 1995 for the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (SISCA), the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), 14. As an historian, Korey worked extensively with both B’nai B’rith and the Anti-Defamation League, and in fact worked directly with the United Nations via the latter’s United Nations Office.

of Israel's resounding victory, Zionism was portrayed as encouraging the notion of "dual citizenship – one a secondary one in the country of actual domicile, and the other, the basic, spiritual and religious one, in Israel."³³ Painted as a threat to both national unity and foreign interests, the Zionist was a twofold threat to the Soviet Union. Worse still, as Zionism is naturally linked with the Jews and Israel, the victims of the vitriolic campaign were very much flesh and blood.

Internally, Soviet Jewry experienced increased oppression as their applications for exit visas were denied. Immigration having always been a paramount concern for Israel, and the East being the most reliable source of bodies, these so-called Soviet *refuseniks* were considered vital to Israel's livelihood.³⁴ For Soviet Jewry themselves, conditions had long been difficult, but the escalation of the anti-Zionist movement was making things more so. To this point, Elie Wiesel records in his 1966 travel memoir:

From everything they said and did not say, I came to the conclusion that many Russian Jews would seize an opportunity to flee the fear and discrimination which pursue them. To be more precise, the few would draw the many after them. Once it began, once permission was granted and the first gate opened, they would follow in multitudes. It has always been that way in the Jewish history. Few have ever

³³ William Korey, *Russian Antisemitism*, 19-20.

³⁴ Henry L. Feingold, "*Silent No More: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American-Jewish Effort, 1967-1989*," *Modern Jewish History* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 46, 78-9. Historian at Baruch College, Feingold argues they were also critical to the USSR's livelihood. Most *refuseniks* belonged to the upper echelon of society, especially in regards to education, and thusly the Soviets rightly feared the potential for a "brain drain" were the gates to be opened. A compelling argument to this position is posed in James A. Michener's September 16, 1972 *New York Times* article entitled, "Soviet Jewry: 'We Want Moral Outcry'." Herein he writes, referencing a tax imposed on educated Jews, "Two reasons have been advanced as to why the Soviets have introduced this extraordinary blackmail. The first argues that Russia suffers from an acute shortage of educated personnel, that it has a heavy financial investment in its educated Jews, and that it cannot afford to see this investment converted into an asset for Israel. This argument falls when Russia fires its Jews who wish to emigrate and refuses to allow them to exercise their skills."

chosen to remain behind alone. But I should emphasize that if the Jews of Russia leave their home it will not be because they oppose the regime or because the objective conditions of their lives are unbearable. Many Russian citizens share those same conditions. They will leave only because of the anti-Jewish atmosphere of which – no matter who is at fault – pervades their homeland. Were they allowed to live full Jewish lives, were they not coerced into disowning their tradition, it is very likely that many of them would prefer to remain rather than set out for the unknown.³⁵

The *refuseniks*, with the help of testimonies like Wiesel's, would eventually garner international attention and create a vocal and broad-based human rights debate, the likes of which would threaten the Soviet image somewhat. More importantly, the humiliation of 1967 compelled the Soviets into ramping up their prejudicial machine in a manner anything but subtle.³⁶ They had long been playing Israel and Soviet Jewry against each other – as they understood their codependence – but there had been at least of modicum of restraint.³⁷

Evidence of such surfaced in early 1968 with the unrest in both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The former witnessed the eruption of student riots while the latter, under the leadership of the liberal Dubcek government, was invaded by the Soviets in

³⁵ Elie Wiesel, *The Jews of Silence: A Personal Report on Soviet Jewry*, trans. by Neal Kozodoy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), 85. Nobel Peace Prize winner, Holocaust survivor, and prolific author, Wiesel tirelessly championed the Jewish cause.

³⁶ Raymond H. Anderson, "Soviet Again Excoriates Zionism as Instigator of Anti-Semitism," *New York Times*, December 31, 1967. The *New York Times* noticed the uptick and reported that the "Soviet Union has recently intensified its attacks on Zionism, an old enemy, in a reaction to the Arab-Israeli war in June. The attacks appear to be aimed at suppressing any sympathy felt by Soviet Jews for Israel's position."

³⁷ Wiesel, *The Jews of Silence*, 62. Wiesel records a conversation he had with a Jewish girl during the revelry of *Simchat Torah*, wherein Soviet anti-Jewish polemics were discussed. "What did she know about the Jewish religion? That it was based on outdated values. And about the Jewish people? That it was made up of capitalists and swindlers. And the state of Israel? That it was aggressive, racist, and imperialist. Where had she learned all this? From textbooks, government pamphlets, and the press."

what is known as the Prague Spring. Both provided convenient excuses for the widespread dissemination of anti-Zionist propaganda throughout the Soviet bloc.³⁸ The *New York Times* reported on the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*'s claims that it was "world Zionism [who] carried on subversive activity in Communist countries" and that the Zionists were to blame "for the liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968."³⁹ In the 1971 Soviet pamphlet "Anti-Sovietism – Profession of Zionists," it is argued that "Zionist circles have been playing an ever bigger role in imperialist activities directed against socialism and the world's progressive forces."⁴⁰ Further claims made by the author include: Zionism profits from anti-Semitism, a history of Zionist-Nazi collaboration, the presence of Zionist infiltration in the United States, and active Zionist espionage and subversion against the Soviet Union.⁴¹ Referencing Soviet Jewry and its connection to Israel, the author unequivocally states, "The Soviet people will never recognise [*sic*] the 'right' of the Zionist gang who are stained with the blood of crimes committed during the war by the nazis [*sic*], and latterly on the occupied Arab territories, to speak in the name of citizens of the USSR of Jewish extraction."⁴² The rant ends with the statement that the

³⁸ Stola, "Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967-1968," 175-201. On page 191 Stola argues that the epithet "Zionist" meant "Jew even if the person so called was not Jewish by any standards; since the 'anti-Zionist campaign targeted some ethnic Poles as well, none could feel safe. The 'anti-Zionist' current of the campaign contained old anti-Semitic clichés, new 'socialist' charges or old ones recycled."

³⁹ Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet Accuses Zionism of Subverting Red Lands," *New York Times*, February 19, 1971.

⁴⁰ V. Bolshakov, "Anti-Sovietism – Profession of Zionists," *Pravda*, February 18 and 19, 1971, 1.

⁴¹ Bolshakov, "Anti-Sovietism – Profession of Zionists," 1-14. Terms used against or in comparison of Zionism are vast and all extremely derogatory. Imperialism, capitalism, chauvinism, anti-Communism, cosmopolitanism, Fascism, and reactionary are an example.

⁴² Bolshakov, "Anti-Sovietism – Profession of Zionists," 14. Addressing the question of Jewish emigration, the author wrote on page 4 that "by declaring that mass emigration earlier to Palestine and now to Israel is the only way of solving the 'Jewish question,' the Zionists have tried and continue to try to artificially oppose the Jews to other nations and people, presenting the former as the 'chosen' people." This notion of Jewish "otherness" is a charge that is often discussed within the Soviet narrative.

“Zionists should understand once and for all that there is no place for Zionism in Soviet society.”⁴³

As Soviet propagandists were busily refining their craft, the Cold War was progressing in the Middle East. For Egypt, the loss of the Sinai to Israel was utterly intolerable and tensions were therefore taut. An ugly war of attrition broke out between the two in 1969 and proved a serious threat to the newly-ensconced ideal of *détente* so idolized by American President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. This was due in large part to the strengthening of ties between Egypt and the USSR, as exemplified in the increase in arms shipments from the latter, and later the breaking of the U.S.-brokered cease fire.⁴⁴ By the time the war ended in 1970 the lines were clearly, and perhaps irreversibly drawn in the Middle East, with Israel aligned with the United States and the Soviets maintaining their sponsorship of the Arab nations, most prominently Egypt. However, this *status quo* was threatened when Nasser unexpectedly died on September 28, 1970 and was replaced by the far less predictable Anwar el-Sadat. Deviating from his predecessor’s emphasis on pan-Arabism, el-Sadat favored a nationalist ideal that chafed at international intervention. This naturally made the Soviets very uncomfortable, especially when relations between Egypt and America began to thaw. Worse still, there were whispers of Egypt giving peace with Israel serious

⁴³ Bolshakov, “Anti-Sovietism – Profession of Zionists,” 14.

⁴⁴ George W. Breslauer, “Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-72: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition?” in *Soviet Strategy in the Middle East*, 23-60, Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 34-47. Breslauer is a specialist of Soviet politics and foreign relations at UC Berkeley.

consideration in exchange for the Sinai.⁴⁵ Change does not come easily, though, in the Middle East, and is in fact most often preceded by war.

Frustration mounting as the superpowers distractedly bandied about the idea of détente, Sadat chose to force the issue. In July of 1972 he demanded Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev remove his military personnel from Egypt.⁴⁶ Half expecting the United States to respond to these indirect overtures by pressuring Israel to exit the Sinai, Sadat was again disappointed by a superpower. America in 1973 was too preoccupied with Vietnam, prompting the Egyptians to lash out militarily. On October 6, 1973, when the Israelis were observing their most holy day – *Yom Kippur* – both Egypt and Syria struck. Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister, had an opportunity to strike pre-emptively but rather erred on the side of caution as she feared the political ramifications such a move would create.⁴⁷ This proved costly as the Arabs' tenacity took the Israelis by surprise and immediately put them on the defensive. The situation quickly devolved into a crisis wherein an emergency airlift from the U.S. to Israel was necessitated, the American Defense Condition (DEFCON) level was increased, and the word nuclear was uttered more than once. Thankfully, after two botched attempts at peace – the UN Security

⁴⁵ Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 155-64. Historian Daigle worked in the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian before teaching at City College of New York.

⁴⁶ George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-72," 47-54.

⁴⁷ Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente*, 294-95. The severe consequences of such action in 1967 were no doubt at the fore of Meir's reasoning.

Council passed Resolutions 338⁴⁸ and 339⁴⁹ before finally succeeding with 340⁵⁰ – the crisis abated on October 25.⁵¹

The *Yom Kippur* War was yet more evidence that the Soviet Union's struggle against Israel and Western presence in the Middle East could not be won via traditional channels. This war certainly challenged Israel's post-1967 aura of invincibility, but the fact remained that they had yet to suffer a military defeat. Moreover, though still a ways off, peace between Israel and Egypt was coming.⁵² For the Soviet Union, it seemed the battle would have to be fought in an entirely different arena, that of international diplomacy. If bullets wouldn't get the job done, then words surely would.

A similar battle was already being waged by this point, and it's one worth noting. The Soviet Jewry problem, first brought to the world's attention after the Six-Day War, was proving to be an enduring and divisive issue. In the post-Holocaust world, where the

⁴⁸ U.N., Security Council, Resolution 338, October 22, 1973, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/338\(1973\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/338(1973)) (accessed June 1, 2016). The Security Council called for a cessation of fighting within twelve hours and the implementation of Resolution 242.

⁴⁹ U.N., Security Council, Resolution 339, October 23, 1973, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/339\(1973\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/339(1973)) (accessed June 1, 2016). Resolution 338 not working, the Security Council decided a day later to send UN observers to the region in the hopes of brokering an immediate cessation of violence.

⁵⁰ U.N., Security Council, Resolution 340, October 25, 1973, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/340\(1973\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/340(1973)) (accessed June 1, 2016). Acknowledging that neither 338 nor 339 had worked, the Security Council again decided to up the ante by sending the United Nations Emergency Force to ensure peace.

⁵¹ Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente*, 294-331. Daigle makes two very compelling arguments which are worth mentioning. First, he contends that Sadat's strike on Israel was not the goal, but rather the means by which he caught the attention of both the United States and USSR, whose lackadaisical approach to the Middle East peace process frustrated him to no end. Secondly, despite their bellicose praise of détente, neither the Americans nor the Soviets showed any real commitment to the ideology in 1973 – rather than steadfastly pursuing peaceful negotiations, they instead reverted to their old ways and supplied their opposing client states. Though peace was finally achieved, and in a rather short span of time, the war nonetheless exposed the “limits of détente.”

⁵² The Camp David Peace Accords were brokered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and signed by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978.

ideal of human rights was held aloft like a torch, sensitivities to transgressions of this sort ran high. Whether the Civil Rights Movement in America or the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, people everywhere were fighting against human rights violations, and the plight of Soviet *refuseniks* would likewise trigger solidarity movements. With petitions for exit visas being leaked to the Western world, these “Soviet Maccabees” as William Korey called them⁵³, appealed to the United Nations as the upholder of human rights. After all, it is written in Article 13 of their Universal Declaration on Human Rights that, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”⁵⁴ However, their cries fell on deaf ears as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was composed of many nations linked to the Soviet Union or generally antipathetic towards Israel.⁵⁵ Through it all the Soviets were unmoved and continued to perpetuate their anti-Zionist campaign, the effects of which were keenly felt within the Soviet Jewish community.

It was not until United States Senator Henry M. Jackson and Representative Charles A. Vanik put forward their amendment to the Russo-American Trade Relations Act of 1971, which denied Russia most-favored-nation (MFN)⁵⁶ status as a consequence of their emigration policies, that the Soviet Jewry struggle became a full-blown Cold War issue. An architect of the amendment is quoted as saying, “If they want trade and

⁵³ William Korey, “The Not-So-Silent Soviet Jews,” *New York Times*, January 22, 1971.

⁵⁴ U.N. General Assembly, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, UNGA Resolution 217A, 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> (accessed June 8, 2016).

⁵⁵ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Membership 1947-2005, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/Membership.aspx> (accessed June 8, 2016). Examples of those who were members at some point in the span of 1970-75 include: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. Excepting Romania, the entire Soviet bloc had terminated diplomatic relations with Israel following the Six-Day War.

⁵⁶ Bestows upon the recipient normal trade relations.

technology from us, let them pay for it in what we want from them – persecuted Jews.”⁵⁷

Signed into law on January 3, 1975, the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment read:

To assure the continued dedication of the United States to the fundamental human rights and welfare of its own citizens... no nonmarket economy country shall participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credit or credit guarantees, directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country –

- 1) Denies its citizens the right or opportunity to join permanently through emigration, a very close relative in the United States...
- 2) Imposes more than a nominal tax on the visas or other documents required for emigration...
- 3) Imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate...⁵⁸

Though the law would only be nominally successful, it nonetheless signified the growing divide between the superpowers regarding the Jewish question. Not only were the two willing to indirectly oppose one another during regional conflicts, but they were also willing to defy the other in matters of diplomacy and human rights. More important to the issue of prejudice in the Cold War, the Soviet Jewry movement underscores an important fact. When the Cold War issue of Jewish emigration was presented to the world’s diplomatic center – the United Nations – the Soviet Union suffered minimal

⁵⁷ Morris Amitay quoted in Henry L. Feingold, “*Silent No More*,” 111.

⁵⁸ *Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade*, Public Law 93-618, title IV, §409 (1973), codified at U.S. Code, §2439, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/2439> (accessed June 8, 2016).

reproach. This is most clearly evidenced in the fact that the emigration struggle continued up until the end of the Cold War. The Soviets were no doubt emboldened, and were thusly preparing to refocus their anti-Zionist campaign and transplant it into the United Nations.

The swift recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union in 1948 was certainly no harbinger for the coming anti-Zionist campaign, but as is clear, the inherent absurdity of the Cold War brought to life old prejudices. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were unaffected, and their consequent actions were often ugly, disappointing, and sometimes inexplicable. Blinded by ideology, the Soviets resurrected the anti-Semitism of the Imperial age and dressed it up to look modern and relevant. As Hitler had turned the religious Jew into the racial Jew, so the Soviets renamed them. Zionism, a political system unfamiliar to many, was obscured and made into a malicious and inclusive enemy. More conveniently, this broad designator applied to both internal and external parties – Soviet Jewry and Israel respectively. Reacting to the progression of the Cold War in the Middle East with its many setbacks and frustrations, and responding to the sentiments of their Arab clients, the Soviet Union slowly perfected their anti-Zionist methodology and rhetoric. By the 1970s they were connoisseurs in the field ready to exhibit their *oeuvre*. Their opportunity would arise in 1975, when they introduced their anti-Zionist ideology to the United Nations, wherein sat a captive and unsuspecting audience.

SECTION III: THE CLIMAX

Chapter IV:

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379

Fifty nations converged on San Francisco in June of 1945 to sign the Charter of the United Nations.¹ In solidarity with the victims of totalitarianism, the Charter proclaimed the purpose of the United Nations (UN) to be the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights” and “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinations of peoples.”² A pillar of civilized diplomacy in a war-weary world, the UN was to be a beacon of hope to the downtrodden and neglected regardless of race, religion, or gender. It was this United Nations that terminated the British Mandate of Palestine and acknowledged the consequent creation of Israel in 1948. It was in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko defended the Zionist desire for an independent state. Three decades later though, in what is a great historical irony, the Soviet Union would strive to condemn and delegitimize the very same Jewish state in the very same assembly hall.

The 1975 world bore little resemblance to its 1945 counterpart. The once vast

¹ United Nations, “History of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html> (accessed July 18, 2016). The United Nations was officially born on October 24, 1945 after a majority of the signatory governments, numbering fifty-one with the inclusion of Poland, ratified the Charter.

² United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html> (accessed July 18, 2016).

colonial system had effectively retracted, infusing the United Nations with a surfeit of fledgling nations disgruntled by the pro-superpower *status quo*.¹ In addition, the United States was chastened by the disappointment and disillusionment of the Vietnam War, viewed by many around the globe and at home as imperialist aggression. Consequently, an air of anti-Americanism emerged in Turtle Bay and quickly developed into a diplomatic crisis. At least this was the opinion of the inimitable cold warrior Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a firebrand from New York whose ascendancy into the political realm is truly remarkable. A child of the Great Depression, Moynihan exchanged his life in Hell's Kitchen for the ivy-covered halls of Harvard. Intelligent, tenacious, and sensitive to cultural diversity, Moynihan served as U.S. Ambassador to India for two years before returning home in 1975. As an adamant defender of democracy, he wrote of the UN's "new majority" in the March issue of *Commentary*. Entitled "The United States in Opposition," Moynihan's article pointed to the newfound socialist mindset of the UNGA – then comprised of one hundred and thirty-eight member states – as a product of the former British Empire and the underlying cause of anti-Americanism. More to the point, he argued that the Soviet Union had effectively wooed this new Third World: "Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union... emerges as the very embodiment of the just state, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and

¹ George A. Brinkley, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Changing Role of the Developing Countries," *The Review of Politics* 32, no. 1 (January, 1970) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406565> (accessed October 7, 2016). According to Brinkley, Khrushchev had long anticipated the dissolution of the colonial system and indeed "gave attention to the 'third world,' where a new wave of national liberation movements gave promise of success beyond anything possible in the past." This success came in the form anti-West sentiment invading the UN, thereby benefiting the Soviets.

the protests these injustices have invoked.”² Using terms like “imperialism” and “colonialism”, Third World nations and their representatives put the United States on the defensive, and Moynihan contended the only thing to do was to go into opposition. The first step was to “recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic.”³ He then urged certitude for America’s envoys: “It is time we grew out of our initial – not a little condescending – supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.”⁴ Moynihan’s confident assurance would have a far greater impact than he perhaps expected.

Moynihan was not short on political clout or prestige despite his unorthodox approach – he had after all encouraged America to start “raising hell” in the UN.⁵ His audacity would see him appointed ambassador to the UN on April 12 by President Gerald Ford. In a planning session with Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Moynihan reaffirmed his position of strength in the face of both Third World antipathy and Soviet antagonism. Consensus reached, he turned to the matter of Israel and urged a strong position of solidarity with them, to which both Ford and Kissinger agreed.⁶ So began the

² Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition,” *Commentary*, March 1, 1975, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-united-states-in-opposition/> (accessed October 31, 2014).

³ Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition.” Moynihan lays out three points of attack: “First, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; and third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare.”

⁴ Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition.”

⁵ Kathleen Teltsch, “Moynihan Calls on U.S. to ‘Start Raising Hell’ in U.N.,” *New York Times*, February 26, 1975. Referring to an anti-Israel resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission, he is reported as arguing that “human-rights issues had been politicized by Communist and third-world countries.”

⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. E-14, part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973-1976*, “The White House, Washington, Memorandum of Conversation, April 12, 1975,” <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve14p1/d22> (accessed June 17, 2016).

tenure of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as American Ambassador to the United Nations. His prescience and mettle would prove providential in the coming months.

Israel's position in the United Nations had grown increasingly tenuous by the mid-1970s. The unpopularity of their military successes in both 1967 and 1973 blackened their reputation and correspondingly improved the standing of the Palestinian people. The so-called "Question of Palestine" was addressed in the 1974 UNGA Resolution 3236, wherein it was said the Palestinian people had been "prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination," and had been "displaced and uprooted."⁷ On the same day the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted observer status via Resolution 3237.⁸ This in spite of the fact that the Palestinian Liberation Organization's National Charter unambiguously declared its goal was the "elimination of Zionism in Palestine."⁹ Invalidating the 1947 UN Partition of Palestine, the Charter denied the Jews' historical link to the Holy Land as "Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality,"¹⁰ and declared Zionism to be a "political movement" that is "racist and fanatic in nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods."¹¹ This added to the fact that the newly

⁷ UN General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, *Question of Palestine*, UNGA Resolution 3236 (XXIX), 1974, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3236\(XXIX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3236(XXIX)) (accessed April 7, 2013).

⁸ UN General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, *Observer Status for the Palestine Liberation Organization*, UNGA Resolution 3237 (XXIX), 1974, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3237\(XXIX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3237(XXIX)) (accessed April 7, 2013).

⁹ "The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968," in the Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, Article 15, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp (accessed June 17, 2016).

¹⁰ "The Palestinian National Charter," Article 20.

¹¹ "The Palestinian National Charter," Article 22.

accepted PLO, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, demanded Israel's expulsion from the UN, there was little reason for Israeli optimism come 1975.¹²

With the ascension of the anti-Zionist PLO and the standing of both America and Israel at their nethermost, the time for the Soviet anti-Zionist movement to triumph had at last come. Having effectively racialized both Jews and Zionism, the Soviets lacked only one thing – a broad-based fight against racism. In what was a perfect storm, the United Nations was preparing to launch its Decade against Racism. A long time coming, as the UN had passed its “Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination” back in 1963.¹³ This was then buttressed two years later by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which passed UNGA Resolution 2106. Article I therein defined racial discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour [*sic*], descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”¹⁴

¹² The expulsion effort was heartily denounced by both houses of the U.S. Congress and effectively stymied by the Egyptians, who were then pursuing peace negotiations with Israel.

¹³ UN General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, *United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, UNGA Resolution 1904 (XVIII), 1963, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/185/79/PDF/NR018579.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 7, 2013). Article I reads, “Discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, colour [*sic*] or ethnic origin is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples.”

¹⁴ UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX), 1965, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/69/IMG/NR021869.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 7, 2013).

The Soviet Union had successfully foiled an attempt by the United States to include a condemnation of anti-Semitism in this resolution.¹⁵

The United Nations' feverish fight against racism coincided with the struggle against South Africa's apartheid system. In 1973, with Resolution 3151, they effectively condemned the South African government, but the rhetoric employed was unexpectedly detrimental to Israel. The General Assembly wrote:

Reaffirming that the practice of *apartheid* constitutes a crime against humanity, *Reaffirming* that the policies and actions of the South African regime have created and continue to pose a serious threat to international peace and security, *Emphasizing* the collusion between Portuguese colonialism, the *apartheid* regime and [Z]ionism, as exemplified by the political, military and financial aid supplied to each other by Portugal, South Africa and Israel... *Condemns*, in particular, the unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, [Z]ionism and Israeli imperialism.¹⁶ (Emphasis in original)

¹⁵ UN General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1311th Meeting, *Agenda Item 58: Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (continued)*, Wednesday, October 20, 1965, <http://hr-travaux.law.virginia.edu/content/general-assembly-20th-session-3rd-committee-1311th-meeting> (accessed July 6, 2016); Ofra Freisel, "Equating Zionism with Racism: The 1965 Precedent," *American Jewish History* 97, no. 3 (July, 2013), <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/511600>. According to Freisel's compelling argument, Soviet resistance to the inclusion of anti-Semitism was twofold. 1) As most UN members viewed anti-Semitism as intrinsically religious, its inclusion would bring into question the Soviet Union's own history of religious repression, and 2) the Soviets wanted the UN to focus solely on racism so as to pressure the United States, whose own difficulties with racism were widely known at this point. More importantly though, when resisting the Americans, the Soviets put forward their own condemnation of Zionism. Each side would ultimately retreat and withdraw both terms, but the precedent was nonetheless made.

¹⁶ UN General Assembly, Twenty-Eighth Session, *Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa*, UNGA Resolution 3151 (XXVIII), 1973, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/282/23/IMG/NR028223.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 7, 2013).

This marked the first time that Zionism, whether directly or indirectly, had been officially condemned by a governmental organization outside the Soviet bloc or Arab world. Said resolution created a dangerous precedent.

The next blow came in Mexico City, which hosted the UN World Conference of the International Women's Year in June and July of 1975. The issue of Palestine was discussed here at length. On June 27 a resolution on Palestinian women was adopted that urged all "States and International organizations to extend assistance – moral and material – to the Palestinian and Arab women and people in their struggle against Zionism, foreign occupation and alien domination, foreign aggression, and help them restore their inalienable rights in Palestine."¹⁷ Only three nations voted against this resolution – Holland, Israel, and the United States. The famed feminist Betty Friedan, a participant in the conference, remembered all the anti-Israel uproar as "one of the most painful experiences in [her] life."¹⁸ Little did she know, the *coup de grâce* had yet to come.

¹⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Resolution on Palestinian Women Adopted in Mexico City, 27 June 1975*, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/96%20Resolution%20on%20Palestinian%20Women%20adopted%20in%20Mexi.aspx> (accessed April 13, 2016). Earlier in the resolution it is written: "Reaffirming the futility of speaking about equality of human beings at a time when millions of human beings are suffering under the yoke of colonialism. Considering that international co-operation and peace requires national independence and liberation, the elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism, fascism, Zionism, apartheid and foreign occupation, alien domination and racial discrimination in all its forms and also the respect of human rights." Including Zionism in such a reprehensible vocabulary list would become commonplace henceforth.

¹⁸ Gil Troy, *Moynihan's Moment: America's Fight against Zionism as Racism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 83. Troy, professor of history at McGill University, maintains the experience galvanized Friedan to be not only an outspoken feminist, but also an ardent defender of Judaism – she herself being Jewish.

On July 2 the “Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace” was put forward which unequivocally proclaimed:

Taking into account the role played by women in the history of humanity, especially in the struggle for national liberation, the strengthening of international peace, and the elimination of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, [Z]ionism, alien domination, racism and *apartheid*...

Decides to promulgate the following principles...

Women and men together should eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, foreign domination and occupation, Zionism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination, the acquisition of land by force and the recognition of such acquisition, since such practices inflict incalculable suffering on women, men, and children.¹⁹ (Emphasis in original)

Once again, only three countries voted against the resolution – Denmark, Israel, and America. Of course the Soviet bloc and Arab countries supported it, but more importantly, because Zionism was associated with apartheid, many African nations were instinctively drawn to approve it as well. This numerical disparity was disheartening for both Israel and the US, especially as the movement began to pick up steam. More importantly, though, the Mexico City declaration was the first time Zionism was linked specifically to racism. With the UN honing in on racism as the consummate evil, and their now endorsing the idea of eliminating Zionism itself – and thereby Israel – the future was bleak.

¹⁹ UN, World Conference of the International Women’s Year, *Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace*, 1975, <http://www.un-documents.net/mex-dec.htm> (accessed April 7, 2013).

Conditions would deteriorate further just weeks later when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) convened on Kampala for their annual assembly. With Uganda's Idi Amin as their sitting president, the gathered heads of state discussed Israel and Palestine *ad nauseam*. Fiercely, and repeatedly, condemning Israel for a cornucopia of sins against the Palestinians, the OAU, in their "Resolution on the Middle East and Occupied Arab Territories," advocated the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and similar institutions. Additionally, they declared that the OAU "Considers Zionism a danger to world peace, and decides to organize an information campaign... to unmask the racist aggressive nature of the Zionist entity in a continuous and planned manner, and to confront and refute all Zionist misleading propaganda."²⁰ Only Zaire voted against the resolution.²¹

Most importantly, the decision handed down by both the OAU and the Mexico City Women's Conference marked crucial victories for the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign. Heretofore the rhetoric had only gained traction within the Soviet bloc and Arab world,

²⁰ Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Twelfth Ordinary Session, *Resolution on the Middle East and Occupied Arab Territories*, AHG/Res. 76 (XII), 1975, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_JULY_28_01_AUGUST_1975_ASSEMBLY_H EADS_STATE_GOVERNMENT_THIRTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf (accessed April 7, 2013).

²¹ Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Twelfth Ordinary Session, *Resolution on the Question of Palestine*, AHG/Res. 77 (XII), 1975, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_JULY_28_01_AUGUST_1975_ASSEMBLY_H EADS_STATE_GOVERNMENT_THIRTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf (accessed April 7, 2013). Zaire would again be the only country to oppose an anti-Israel resolution, this one being the "Resolution on the Question of Palestine." Herein the OAU charged the United States with colluding with Israel, thereby perpetuating Palestinian suffering. It is also charged that Israel enforces a policy of "Judaizing" the land and culture of the Holy Land, which is considered "war crimes and a challenge to mankind at large." Former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eban wrote in the August 7, 1975 *New York Times* article entitled "Israel and the Future of the United Nations Ideal" that "Israel's expulsion or suspension as proposed from Jidda and Kampala is little short of moral madness." His reference to Jidda, Saudi Arabia is in relation to the meeting of thirty-nine Islamic countries who, like the OAU, favored the idea of Israeli expulsion.

where anti-Israel sentiments were familiar, but now that the African nations and the women of the world had bought into the vernacular proliferated by the Soviets and their allies, the doors to the UN General Assembly stood open. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan had sensed the coming storm, but he was outnumbered and outgunned. However, his shrewd understanding of the Soviet endgame would allow him to put up a fight worthy of praise.

Idi Amin, for his part, was not yet done fanning the proverbial flames. On October 1, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, the Ugandan President alleged the United States had been infiltrated by Zionists in all levels of society. He then endorsed Israeli expulsion from the UN as well as the “extinction of Israel as a state.”²² Israel’s response²³ to Amin’s divisive speech was tame in comparison to that of Moynihan, who is quoted as calling Amin a “racist murderer.”²⁴ The African bloc shot back by saying that if “Mr. Moynihan confused his work in the United Nations with defense of Zionism, he should ‘go to Israel as soon as possible.’”²⁵ This entire exchange, though, was nothing but a sideshow to the real battle.

²² Paul Hofmann, “Amin, at U.N., Appeals to Americans to Rid Their Society of Zionists,” *New York Times*, October 1, 1975.

²³ “Allon Slams Amin’s Diatribe a Violation of the UN Charter,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, October 3, 1975. Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs Yigal Allon is quoted as saying, “I wish to record the Government of Israel’s most emphatic protest at this call for the extinction of a member state in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that such a flagrant suggestion was made at a meeting of the General Assembly. That such shameful expressions can be heard at the General Assembly of the United Nations surely redounds to the discredit of the world organization which was created to maintain international peace and security and to be a ‘center for harmonizing the actions of nations.’”

²⁴ “Moynihan Assails Uganda President, Delegate to U.N. Endorses Description of Amin as ‘Racist Murderer’,” *New York Times*, October 4, 1975. On October 6, 1975, the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* quotes Dr. Thomas P. Melady, former American Ambassador to Uganda as saying Amin’s speech “confirmed his anti-Semitism,” which was “already indicated during the Yom Kippur War when he called for the destruction of Israel and named a public park in Kampala after Hitler.”

²⁵ Kathleen Teltsch, “Africans and Arabs Denounce Moynihan in the U.N.,” *New York Times*, October 7, 1975.

Moynihan understood this fact, but his willingness to fight was not for Israel itself. As he recalls in his memoir, the “Zionism resolution was aimed not merely at the State of Israel, but at Zionists. Which meant most of the Jews of the United States. I did not represent the State of Israel, but I most assuredly did represent the United States. And the peoples thereof.”²⁶ However, he would work in tandem with his Israeli counterpart, Ambassador Chaim Herzog, to formulate a plan of opposition. Central to their plan was the simple argument that the notion of equating Zionism with racism was a lie. Ever the realist though, Moynihan wrote, “As we were certain to lose the vote, it was essential that we win the argument.”²⁷

In the UN Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, or the Third Committee, Somalia, acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, put forward seven amendments to the “Programme [*sic*] of the Decade against Racism” which identified Zionism as a form of racial discrimination. The documents would soon be withdrawn due to staunch Western backlash,²⁸ but after revision a new document, draft resolution C, was submitted. On October 17 there was a call to vote, through which the resolution resoundingly passed – the final tally being seventy to twenty-nine, with twenty-seven abstentions.²⁹ In a speech to the United Nations, American adviser Leonard Garment said the resolution “destroys

²⁶ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, with Suzanne Weaver, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1975), 178.

²⁷ Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 179. Their tripartite plan was as follows: 1) argue simply that the resolution was a lie; 2) maintain that any who voted for it were in fact proving the UN could and would lie; and 3) contend the resolution would ultimately kill the UN’s highly touted Decade against Racism.

²⁸ Paul Hofmann, “U.N. Again Delays Any Action Linking Zionism with Racism,” *New York Times*, October 14, 1975.

²⁹ Paul Hofmann, “U.N. Unit Endorses Draft Linking Zionism to Racism,” *New York Times*, October 18, 1975. The ayes consisted of the Soviet bloc, Arab nations, and many African and Asian states, while the nays drew primarily from the European Economic Community (EEC), the United States, Canada, Australia, several Latin American countries, and of course Israel.

the moral force of the concept of racism, making it nothing more than an epithet to be flung arbitrarily at one's adversary."³⁰ Similarly, Israel's Herzog said, "How dare these people talk of racism to us – we, who have suffered more than any other nation in the world from racist theories and practices, a nation which has suffered the most terrifying holocaust in the history of mankind."³¹ Characteristically unabashed, Moynihan walked up to Herzog after his speech and, loud enough for all to hear, said "F--- 'em!"³²

Before the General Assembly could decide whether Zionism was indeed racism, Moynihan launched a vigorous campaign to appeal to any undecided nations. He understood that the Arabs especially were not above "buy[ing] themselves a majority," usually via oil.³³ To counter this, he focused his efforts on the African nations who were torn between Arab pressure and an abiding concern for the anti-apartheid movement, which was being overshadowed by all the Zionist talk.³⁴ Additionally, he side-stepped the prejudicial elements by underscoring the Cold War nature of the measure. Israel, not Zionism, was the target he said, "and not the state of Israel nearly so much as the significance of Israel as one of the very few places outside of Western Europe and North America... where Western democratic principles survive."³⁵ The verity of this argument is seen in the long history of reactive Soviet anti-Zionism. Any escalation in the

³⁰ Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 182.

³¹ Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 184.

³² Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 185.

³³ Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 181.

³⁴ Paul Hofmann, "Black Africa is of Several Minds about Jews, Israel," *New York Times*, October 19, 1975. One important fact to consider, which Hofmann highlights, is that Africa in general was little acquainted with the Jewish people prior to 1948 – Ethiopia being the most obvious exception. Ironically, they had long benefited from Israeli humanitarian and military aid – Idi Amin himself received military training in Israel. Interestingly, while calling for the extinction of Israel, Amin was wearing the paratrooper's wings given him by Israel.

³⁵ "Moynihan Says U.N. Must Bar Resolution Condemning Zionism," *New York Times*, October 22, 1975.

propaganda consistently came on the heels of some Soviet political or military setback.³⁶

No matter the validity of Moynihan's case, his pleas were falling on deaf ears. This was due in no small part to the surprising spirit of apathy within the Jewish community itself.

Chaim Herzog, striving to rally diaspora Jews, formulated a three-part strategy that involved cooperating with non-Jews, defining the anti-Zionist movement as fundamentally anti-Semitic, and getting the Jews to take the matter personally.³⁷ The first two were accomplished relatively easily, but the last was a challenge. Herzog saw the attack for what it was – an assault on Israel's legitimacy, but many in the American Jewish community were blind to this fact. Speaking to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Herzog asked, "Where were the Jewish people?"³⁸ Underscoring the contrariety of Jewish silence at the heart of one of the largest Jewish communities in the world – New York City – he continued by scoffing: "With a small Israeli delegation fighting desperately against the heaviest possible odds to defend Jewry from a major anti-Semitic attack against Jews wherever they may be, the lead on this issue was taken to its eternal credit by the United States delegation."³⁹ For what it's worth, his comments were heeded. The next day the conference took out a *New York Times* ad in which they spoke of their pride in Israel and of their unwavering support for Zionism as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.⁴⁰ It was

³⁶ The Soviets cut ties with Israel in 1967 following the Six-Day War. Similarly, the rejection of Jewish exit visas became policy in 1967, a year that witnessed a noticeable uptick in Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda. Internally, the 1968 unrest in Poland and Czechoslovakia was painted as a Zionist ploy. By 1973 and the *Yom Kippur War*, the Soviets were working well with their Arab allies, who enforced a severe oil embargo.

³⁷ Troy, *Moynihan's Moment*, 116.

³⁸ "Herzog Asserts Jews Didn't Aid Israelis in U.N. Zionism Debate," *New York Times*, October 25, 1975.

³⁹ "Herzog Asserts Jews Didn't Aid Israelis in U.N. Zionism Debate," *New York Times*.

⁴⁰ "...this is an obscene act," *New York Times*, advertisement, October 26, 1975.

too little too late, as the proverbial ball was already rolling. Though aggressive Jewish resistance may not have been enough to tip the scales, the apathy was nonetheless disheartening and inexplicable for both Herzog and Moynihan.⁴¹ Neither man prone to dawdling, they nonetheless shrugged off their frustration and prepared for the pending UNGA vote.

As the vote drew ever nearer, more American leaders became vocal in their support for Israel. Congress passed a resolution condemning the whole charade, and President Ford issued a statement of solidarity as well.⁴² The Soviet dissident Andrei D. Sakharov declared, “If this resolution is adopted, it can only contribute to anti-semitic [*sic*] tendencies in many countries, by giving them the appearance of international legality.”⁴³ Amidst it all though, there was some fear that European countries in particular would renege on their promises of solidarity for fear of Soviet and Arab backlash. Nerves were taut as the calendar turned to November 10, 1975 – the day of the UNGA vote.

Before analyzing the outcome of that day though, it is important to examine Ambassador Moynihan’s reasoning for opposing the Zionism is racism charge. Moynihan, a fiery Irish Catholic, was neither Jewish nor staunchly pro-Israel. Neither was he standing in defense of Zionism for the sake of the Jews either. He perceived the entire fracas to be the handiwork of the Soviet Union intent on undermining both the

⁴¹ Yohanan Manor, *To Right a Wrong: The Revocation of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 Defaming Zionism* (New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc., 1996), 30. Manor, former General Director of the Information Department of the World Zionist Organization, contends that Jewish apathy was rooted in a long-standing tradition of ignoring the UN as an “unimportant body.”

⁴² Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 189.

⁴³ Andrei D. Sakharov, quote in *A Dangerous Place*, 191.

United States, in its state of vulnerability, and Israel, the perpetual thorn in their side. Without the Cold War, the entire pretense would have been superfluous. As the historian Gil Troy rightly infers, “Terms like ‘racism,’ ‘colonialism,’ and ‘imperialism’ came straight out of the Communist playbook for demonizing enemies.”⁴⁴ However, it would not be enough to simply accuse the Soviets of subterfuge, and Moynihan wisely understood this, which is why he painstakingly worked to craft a defense of Zionism that invalidated the charge of racism.

As discussed in the previous chapter, for centuries the Jew had been vilified primarily as a religious being, and the perniciousness of this variety of anti-Semitism is sobering. However, the racializing of Jews most notably utilized by the Nazis had transformed anti-Semitism into a malleable political weapon. Essentially doing the same but with new terminology, the Soviets’ tactics in 1975 were no different, but Moynihan had to prove it. He understood Zionism to be the Jewish national liberation movement – *ergo* political – which came about during an era when various forms of nationalism were ubiquitous throughout Europe and Asia. Judaism, to him, centered on the rabbinic law which defined a Jew as either the child of a Jewish mother or *a convert to the religion*. This is the crux of Moynihan’s position, and as he succinctly summarizes, “If one can join or resign from the Chosen People, it is scarcely a racially determined category.”⁴⁵ As per racialism, to be a Jew is an inescapable condition, and yet the traditions of Judaism allow for Gentile conversion regardless of race. In other words, though an

⁴⁴ Gil Troy, *Moynihan’s Moment*, 11.

⁴⁵ Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, 193.

ethnic religion, Judaism is not racially selective.⁴⁶ Of course, persuading the United Nations General Assembly of that was another matter entirely.

On the General Assembly's docket for November 10, 1975 was an assortment of Israeli-centric resolutions. The first two dealt specifically with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, recalling Resolution 3236 of a year prior, by urging the PLO to become more vocal in the Mid-East peace process and elevating it within the ranks of the UN.⁴⁷ Ambassador Herzog argued this only "legitimized [the PLO's] terrorist activities."⁴⁸ No matter, though, for both passed. Next came the "Implementation of the Programme [*sic*] for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination," which condemned persecution and recognized the "struggle of oppressed peoples to liberate themselves from racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, colonialism, and alien domination."⁴⁹ With the PLO promoted and racism the UN's white whale, a veritable perfect storm for Zionism's downfall was rolling in.

⁴⁶ For an explanation of the subtle nuances between ethnicity and race, see note 1 of page 47.

⁴⁷ U.N. General Assembly, *Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to Participate in the Efforts for Peace in the Middle East*, UNGA Resolution 3375 (XXX), 1975, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3375\(XXX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3375(XXX)) (accessed April 7, 2013); U.N. General Assembly, *Question of Palestine*, UNGA Resolution 3376 (XXX), 1975, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3376\(XXX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3376(XXX)) (accessed April 7, 2013). Resolution 3376 established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRP). According to the Anti-Defamation League, CEIRP is the only "United Nations organ devoted to a specific people, [and] is the single most prolific source of material bearing the official imprimatur of the U.N. which maligns and debases the Jewish State." Anti-Defamation League, "The United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People: 35 Years of Demonizing Israel," <http://www.adl.org/israel-international/un-international-organizations/c/CEIRPP-FINAL-REPORT-2009.pdf> (accessed October 5, 2016).

⁴⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement in the General Assembly by Ambassador Herzog – 3 November 1975," <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/127%20Statement%20in%20the%20General%20Assembly%20by%20Ambassado.aspx> (accessed April 13, 2016).

⁴⁹ UN, General Assembly, *Implementation of the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination*, UNGA Resolution 3377 (XXX), 1975, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3377\(XXX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3377(XXX)) (accessed April 7, 2013).

Draft resolution C came next. The pre-vote speechmaking began with Dahomey's Ambassador Tiamiou Adjibade asserting his country's respect for Judaism in spite of their rejection of "Zionism as a racist, expansionist ideology in its manifestations."⁵⁰ Kuwaiti Ambassador Fayez Sayegh said, "We reject the claim of Zionism to be co-extensive with Judaism. We reject the claim of Zionism to be co-extensive with the Jewish people, and therefore, we reject the claim of Zionism, that to be anti-Zionist is to be anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic."⁵¹ Amidst the spoken support of West Germany, the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, and New Zealand, Chaim Herzog rose to give his speech. With sardonic flair, he began by acknowledging that it was ironically the thirty-seventh anniversary of *Kristallnacht*⁵², and that Hitler would "have felt at home" in the General Assembly.⁵³ He spoke in defense of Zionism by saying:

Zionism is the name of the national movement of the Jewish people and is the modern expression of the ancient Jewish heritage. The Zionist ideal, as set out in the Bible, has been, and is, an integral part of the Jewish religion... For Zionism is nothing more – and nothing less – than the Jewish people's sense of origin and destination in the land, linked eternally with its name... For us, the Jewish people, this resolution, based on hatred, falsehood and arrogance, is devoid of any

⁵⁰ UN Watch. "1975 UN Debate on 'Zionism is Racism'." YouTube website. <https://youtu.be/YGHFNBybe4s> (accessed June 24, 2016).

⁵¹ UN Watch, "1975 UN Debate on 'Zionism is Racism',"

⁵² *Kristallnacht* refers to a series of anti-Jewish pogroms throughout Nazi territories on November 9-10, 1938. Jewish businesses, homes, and synagogues were destroyed, and because of the abundance of broken windows, the events became popularly known as the "Night of Broken Glass."

⁵³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement in the General Assembly by Ambassador Herzog on Item Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination – 10 November 1975," <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/129%20Statement%20in%20the%20General%20Assembly%20by%20Ambassado.aspx> (accessed April 13, 2016).

moral or legal value. For us, the Jewish people, this is no more than a piece of paper, and we shall treat it as such.⁵⁴

Before stepping down from the podium, Herzog tore the proposed resolution in two.

Though proud and defiant, his words would have little effect as the voting commenced.

The roll was called, the votes declared, and the final tally totaled. With seventy-two in favor, thirty-five against, and thirty-two abstentions, United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3379.⁵⁵ Recalling UN Resolutions 1904 and 3151, as well as the Mexico City and Kampala decisions, the new resolution concluded that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”⁵⁶ And so it was, with surprising little fanfare, that the founding political movement of the nation of Israel, whose very existence was approved by the United Nations, was inexorably linked with the abhorrent label of racism. Devoid of all reason and sagacity, the decision was the crowning achievement of the anti-Zionist movement initiated by the Soviets. Indeed, without getting their hands dirty in the melee, the Soviets were able to castigate a political nemesis via rhetorical and diplomatic means. Exploiting Arab animus, African credulity, and the unbridled and fortuitous anti-American mood, the Soviets were able to wage a

⁵⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement in the General Assembly by Ambassador Herzog on Item Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination – 10 November 1975.”

⁵⁵ Manor, *To Right a Wrong*, 51-6. With the exception of Romania, the entire Soviet bloc voted in favor. They were joined by all other Communist nations, and all Arab and Islamic countries. A majority of African nations likewise supported it while Latin America was a mixed-bag and Asia by-and-large abstained. Of the Western nations, only Portugal voted for 3379.

⁵⁶ UN, General Assembly, *Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, UNGA Resolution 3379 (XXX), 1975, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3379\(XXX\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3379(XXX)) (accessed April 7, 2013). Another document, the “Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries,” adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, is credited for this decision. This meeting “condemned [Z]ionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology.”

Cold War fight with mere words. Of course, it could not end without Daniel Patrick Moynihan having said anything.

He had decided to wait until after the vote to speak in order that his ardent personality could not be blamed for the outcome. His speech certainly should go down in the UN annals as one of the most impassioned. Carrying himself with authority, Moynihan thumbed his nose at propriety and began:

The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and before the world, that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act... The proposition to be sanctioned by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations is that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.” Now this is a lie. But as it is a lie which the United Nations has now declared to be a truth, the actual truth must be restated. The very first point to be made is that the United Nations has declared Zionism to be racism – without ever having defined racism... Lest I be unclear, the United Nations has in fact on several occasions defined “racial discrimination”... racial discrimination is a practice; racism is a doctrine... What we have here is a lie – a political lie of a variety well known to the twentieth century, and scarcely exceeded in all that annal of untruth and outrage. The lie is that Zionism is a form of racism. The overwhelmingly clear truth is that it is not... Indeed, the idea that Jews are a “race” was invented not by Jews but by those who hated Jews... The terrible lie that has been told here today will have terrible consequences... The harm will arise first because it will strip from racism the precise and abhorrent meaning that it still precariously holds today. How will the people of the world feel about racism and the need to struggle against it, when they are told that it is an

idea as broad as to include the Jewish national liberation movement?⁵⁷

With a quick thank-you to the presiding UN president, Moynihan stepped down amidst tepid applause. The act was done, the fight lost, and the future uncertain. The success of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign, which had been methodically advancing towards this climax for years, was at last cemented in United Nations law. More importantly, what was a political movement – Zionism – was officially racialized and besmirched. Though the decision was by no means binding on Israeli policy, the very principle of the matter was not lost on the Jews. With the legitimacy of Israel challenged, their enemies both at home and abroad would be emboldened. After all, how hard is it to fight a foe whose very existence has been invalidated?

The reaction in both America and Israel was vocal and broad-based. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin issued a statement that evening: “These resolutions are devoid of any moral validity... The people of Israel totally reject the Assembly’s resolutions. Our reply – together with the Jewish people throughout the world – will be: Increasing unity in the effort to reinforce the strength of the State of Israel in the fulfillment of its historic tasks.”⁵⁸ Here in the United States the public backlash was fervent. Just a day after the

⁵⁷ U.S. Congressional Record, “Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, November 10, 1975,”

<http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/12/30/moynihans-moment-the-historic-1975-u-n-speech-in-response-to-zionism-is-racism/> (accessed October 15, 2014).

⁵⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “General Assembly Resolution 3375-3376 and 3379 – PLO invitation – Question of Palestine – Equation of Zionism with Racism – Reaction of Prime Minister Rabin – 10 November 1975,”

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/128%20General%20Assembly%20Resolutions%203375-%203376%20and%2033.aspx> (accessed April 13, 2016).

decision, a crowd of thousands gathered in New York City in protest.⁵⁹ Congress contemplated either a reduction in U.S. funding to the UN, or even a complete withdrawal from the institution – public opinion favored the former.⁶⁰ The African-American community responded as well. A *New York Times* advertisement taken out by the Black Americans to Support Israel Committee (BASIC) argued, “Zionism is not racism, but the legitimate expression of the Jewish people’s self-determination.”⁶¹ Even American popular culture got involved, with Chevy Chase reporting in his Saturday Night Live news sketch, “The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution equating Zionism with racism. Black entertainer Sammy Davis Jr., a convert to Judaism, was quoted as saying, ‘What a breakthrough, now finally I can hate myself.’”⁶² All joking aside, the decision was very unpopular in the United States and certainly aroused the post-Vietnam populace.

What the disillusioned public wanted most of all though was an explanation. Many blamed Moynihan’s hardline approach for the outcome; one fellow ambassador even comparing him to Wyatt Earp in the OK Corral.⁶³ In his defense, Moynihan argued that his job was not to “paper over differences, but to make their existence known.”⁶⁴

⁵⁹ John F. Burns, “Huge Rally Here Condemns U.N. Anti-Zionism Move,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1975. The attendees were not local, but had traveled from all over the country. Some of their chants included: “Zionism Forever,” “Protect the U.N. From Its Own Racists,” “R.I.P. United Nations, 1945-75,” and “You Are Invited to Be an Ambassador to the U.N. – Just Say ‘Sieg Heil’.”

⁶⁰ David Binder, “U.S. Weighs Move on Zionism,” *New York Times*, November 13, 1975; “Poll Finds 49% Opposed to U.N. Action on Zionism,” *New York Times*, December 16, 1975. The outcome of the Zionism is racism debate caused a drastic shift in Americans’ view of the United Nations, with almost half favoring a cut in funding.

⁶¹ “Black Americans to Support Israel Committee,” *New York Times*, advertise, November 23, 1975.

⁶² Chevy Chase, *Saturday Night Live*, episode 5 (originally aired November 15, 1975).

⁶³ Troy, *Moynihan’s Moment*, 191.

⁶⁴ Tom Buckley, “Brawler at the U.N.: Pat Moynihan, the kid from Hell’s Kitchen, has a fighting style made up of blarney, bravura, charm, and quickness of mind,” *New York Times*, December 7, 1975.

More to the point, in his own estimation he was a “little dismayed that in the face of what was a considerable success, it is being put about that we somehow failed.”⁶⁵ He makes this argument by pointing to the final vote tally. Whereas in Mexico City only one nation voted with America and Israel, in the General Assembly sixty-seven either opposed or abstained. A small consolation perhaps, the increase was due in no small part to Moynihan’s drive to “win the argument.”

There is a point to be made in all this though, and it has to do with motivation. After the resolution was passed, several nations came out and admitted their general ignorance of the whole issue. A representative from Mauritius is quoted as confessing, “Many people voted without knowing what Zionism is,” or voted based on “what the Palestinians [told them] Zionism is.”⁶⁶ Indeed, the combination of persuasive Arab lobbying – the impetus being their vast oil reserves – and widespread anti-Americanism throughout the Third World were credited for 3379’s success.⁶⁷ Such was the brilliance of the Soviet Union’s anti-Zionist campaign. Beginning at home, they diligently refined their rhetoric and tactics before drawing in the Arabs and Third World, both of whom were inclined to similar anti-West sentiments. The eventual success in the United Nations General Assembly was unquestionably their *magnum opus*.

The consequences of UNGA 3379 must be understood. The United Nations’ ruling not only undermined Zionism as a national movement; it also delegitimized the

⁶⁵ Daniel Patrick Moynihan in a letter to Averell Harriman, November 20, 1975. In Steven R. Weisman, ed., *Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 381-82.

⁶⁶ Paul Hofmann, “Why and How Anti-Zionism Move Won,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1975.

⁶⁷ Hofmann, “Why and How Anti-Zionism Move Won.”

nation of Israel. With racism identified as a crime, Israel was deemed guilty. As *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz phrased it, “Israel could only cease to be criminal if it ceased to be both Jewish and sovereign.”⁶⁸ This would have a profound impact on their diplomatic relations, economic ties, and even national defense – it became difficult to function with the charge of racism always hanging over their heads. More fundamentally though, the entire charge of Zionism as racist denied the Jews their right to national autonomy and relegated them to the sidelines, not to mention the uncertain fate of Soviet Jewry. Zionism is not a racist ideology, but by ignoring this fact, any and all enemies of Jews, Zionists, or Israel were granted permission to oppose one and all with a single word. What Moynihan dubbed the “Big Red Lie,” United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 denigrated a people via distorted terminology.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” *Commentary*, July 1, 1976.

<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-abandonment-of-israel/> (accessed October 13, 2014).

⁶⁹ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Big Red Lie: It was the Soviets, not the Arabs, who came up with ‘Zionism is racism’,” *Washington Post*, September 29, 1991.

Conclusion:

The years following 1975 witnessed the unrelenting dissemination of anti-Zionist rhetoric across the globe. In 1976 an international symposium convened in Tripoli to discuss the issue of Zionism and racism; over eighty countries participated.¹ Between 1976 and 1984, fourteen different international bodies adopted resolutions on UNGA 3379.² The Soviets' anti-Zionist campaign continued to pump out material non-stop, even creating an Anti-Zionist Committee in 1983 for the express purpose of publicizing the "Soviet campaign to equate Zionism with racism."³ Additionally, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) revived their crusade to evict Israel from the United Nations (UN).⁴ College campuses likewise became bastions of anti-Zionist rhetoric; phraseology such as "The State of Israel is Zionism, Zionism is racism" was frequently adopted by student organizations throughout the West and proved injurious to not only Israel, but to individual Jewish students as well.⁵ To be sure, UNGA 3379 not only

¹ International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, *Zionism and Racism: Proceedings of an International Symposium* (New Brunswick, NJ: North America, 1979). The proceedings were opened with these words from Abdullah Sharafuddin: "Zionism, with its unhumane ethnic, racist principles, with its devilish schemes which generate chaos all over the world, with its dangerous plans to dominate, with its disregard for the appeals and resolutions of international organizations, and with its beastly octopus which has almost a decisive role in directing the policies of the greatest countries in the world, cannot be viewed as a threat to this region alone, but to the whole world... since racism is unjust and evil, and since Zionism is a form of racism... it is the duty of all of us to come to the aid of the followers of the religion of Moses by eliminating the injustices which they commit."

² Yohanan Manor, *To Right a Wrong: The Revocation of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 Defaming Zionism* (New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc., 1996), 63.

³ Andrew Rosenthal, *New York Times*, December 8, 1987. A propaganda organization, the Anti-Zionist Committee proved ineffectual and was incorporated into another Soviet committee dedicated to broader human rights issues in 1987.

⁴ Manor, *To Right a Wrong*, 60-83.

⁵ Manor, *To Right a Wrong*, 66-7.

validated anti-Zionist sentiment and propaganda, it also validated and even encouraged anti-Semitic discrimination reminiscent of bygone days. Because the term Zionism is vague to so many and too often flippantly applied to Israel and Jews collectively, the victims of the Soviet propaganda were diverse.

Not until the Soviet Union began teetering on the brink of collapse did the revocation of UNGA 3379 become an option. Since 1975 there had always been a contingent pursuing just such an outcome, but when U.S. leadership took charge in 1989, repeal became a probability. Extending beyond principle, America's reasoning for involvement was twofold: 1) challenge the Soviets, and 2) foster the Arab-Israeli peace process, which had been stalled as the latter staunchly opposed any UN involvement.¹ In March of 1990 the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, chaired by then Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, assembled to discuss the possibility. Moynihan again reiterated his sentiments of fifteen years earlier by arguing the resolution was based on Soviet "totalitarian propaganda, distortion, and lying."² The resultant Senate Joint Resolution 246 in January of 1990 made clear the United States' commitment to see 3379 revoked.³

The American campaign would later be bolstered by a shift in Soviet policy as expressed in Senate Joint Resolution 110 of September 24, 1991: "Whereas the Soviet Union vigorously supported the adoption of Resolution 3379 but has now stated that it no

¹ Manor, *To Right a Wrong*, 234.

² Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, *Revoking the U.N. Zionism Resolution*, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, S. Hrg. 101-655, 1.

³ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Joint Resolution Calling Upon the United Nations to Repeal General Assembly Resolution 3379*, 101st Cong., 1990, S.J.Res.246.

longer supports the resolution... the United States and the Soviet Union should lead an effort to promptly repeal [UNGA] 3379.”⁴ Just the day before, President George H.W. Bush had addressed the General Assembly. He first argued that “to equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself,” before calling on the assembly to repeal the 1975 decision.⁵ Unmoved by his speech, the undecided members were later threatened with a cessation of American diplomatic relations or funding.⁶ Message received, the UNGA did finally repeal the 1975 decision on December 16, 1991 with a single sentence: “The General Assembly decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.”⁷ At long last the farcical definition of Zionism as racism was officially expunged from the United Nations’ record.

Though a welcome conclusion to the fight in the UNGA, the tenets of the anti-Zionist movement proved indomitable and perpetual. The language employed by the Soviets and their Arab allies are still evident today and too often remain uncontested. At the 2001 UN-sponsored World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa – boycotted by the United States and Israel – calls were heard for the revival of the Zionism-is-racism

⁴ Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, *Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should lead an effort to promptly repeal United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX)*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, S.J.Res.110.

⁵ UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fourth Meeting, A/46/PV.4, Forty-Sixth Session, September 23, 1991, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N91/612/17/PDF/N9161217.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed August 12, 2016).

⁶ Manor, *To Right a Wrong*, 259. This idea had been suggested by Moynihan previously when he asked, “Did we ever tell one country, just one country, that you are getting American money, and you are not getting it anymore until you change your mind?”

⁷ UN General Assembly, *Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination*, A/Res/46/86, 74th plenary, December 16, 1991. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r086.htm> (accessed August 13, 2016). The final vote tally was one hundred and eleven in favor, twenty-five opposed, and thirteen in abstention.

charge.⁸ Additionally, Israel's relationship with the Palestinians was compared to South African apartheid, a charge which the U.S. State Department views as, "Within the UN context... a variation on the anti-Semitic 'Zionism is Racism' resolution."⁹ The current Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which idealizes the South African anti-apartheid struggle and the American Civil Rights Movement, defines Zionism as a "racist ideology," decries "Israel's entrenched system of racial discrimination," and accuses Israel of apartheid, colonialism, and ethnic cleansing.¹⁰ More worrisome still is the employment of such rhetoric by those who do not openly profess anti-Israel views – former President Jimmy Carter did so when he titled his 2006 book *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid*.¹¹ This simple act underscores the pervasiveness of the language – it is deemed acceptable and applied without a second thought. As representatives of the American Jewish Committee succinctly state, "...advertisers and political propagandists know, sloganized messages repeated often enough affect how people view matters and can become part of their thoughts, feelings, and 'consciences'."¹² This is certainly the case for the modern anti-Israel lexicon, which is undeniably resonant of the Soviets' Cold War anti-Zionist campaign. The vestige of Imperial Russia's anti-Semitism was wed to

⁸ Dr. Harold Brackman. "Boycott Divestment Sanctions (BDS) against Israel: An Anti-Semitic, Anti-Peace Poison Pill," Simon Wiesenthal Center (March, 2013), http://www.wiesenthal.com/atf/cf/%7B54d385e6-f1b9-4e9f-8e94-890c3e6dd277%7D/REPORT_313.PDF (accessed October 4, 2016). On page 47 it says that "Today, the distinction between legitimate criticism of the policies and practices of the state of Israel and anti-Semitism can become blurred in the UN context."

⁹ United States Department of State, "Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism: A Report Provided to the United States Congress," 53.

¹⁰ <https://bdsmovement.net/> (accessed August 11, 2016). Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions was created in July 2005 and now works in tandem with the Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) movement, which is held on college campuses throughout the world. <http://apartheidweek.org/> (accessed August 13, 2016).

¹¹ Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

¹² Sidney Liskofsky and Donna Arzt, "Incitement to National, Racial and Religious Hatred in United Nations Fora," in the Blaustein Library, American Jewish archives, http://www.ajarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/755.pdf (accessed October 14, 2016).

the modernized methodology of the Nazis, and the result was cleverly employed by the Soviet Union and their allies to undermine a Cold War – *ergo* political – enemy. In short, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 was a Cold War manifestation of Soviet anti-Semitism designed to serve a very clear political purpose.

The Soviet Union's relationship with Israel was one marked by change and politicization. In 1947 they sponsored the UN's partition plan, and in 1948 they were second only to the United States in expressing their recognition of Israel. However, as the Cold War progressed and Israel inclined itself to the West, Soviet solidarity waned. Troubled by both internal and external uncertainty, the Soviet Union not only withdrew from Israel, but began challenging the Jewish state. A heady mix of Cold War idiocy, old school anti-Semitism, and communist intrigue allowed for the development of the anti-Zionist movement. The intrinsic ambiguity of the term "Zionism" made the victims of the campaign quite diverse – Soviet Jewry, Israel, and the United States all suffered. Moreover, as events unfolded in the Middle East, most often in favor of Israel and America, the Soviets reacted via their anti-Zionist propaganda machine. This would carry into the 1970s, when the Soviets exported their ideas to the United Nations.

The Soviets did not act alone though, for their Arab allies eagerly colluded in the fight. For them, the struggle against Israel was not a byproduct of the Cold War, for their contention with the Jewish state dated back to before the First World War. It was here that the Arab people were deceived and disillusioned by European imperial powers, namely Great Britain. The volatility of the Mandatory period did nothing to alleviate the tension. The Arabs suffered loss again when the world, mourning the atrocities of the

Holocaust, heartily supported the creation of a Jewish state. In the eyes of the Arab world, Israel would be invariably linked to European imperialism, a fact exacerbated by the Cold War when America eventually became Israel's ally. The resultant antipathy blended well with Soviet anti-Zionism, and when the opportunity presented itself in 1975, their shared animus prevailed in the United Nations.

All that said, the anti-Zionist movement ought not to be dismissed as a mere Cold War issue. Its significance is still keenly felt today when critics of Israel are allowed to utilize inappropriate and unsubstantiated language without reproach. Say what you will about Israel, the fact of the matter is that there remains a distortion of terminology. As the nationalist movement of the Jewish people, Zionism birthed a political entity – Israel – that is not based on racial discrimination. Zionism's supporters and detractors are broad-based and diverse, so to generalize in censure is inappropriate¹³ Returning once again to the EUMC's "Working Definition of Antisemitism," it is seen that "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor," is tantamount to anti-Semitism. "However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic [*sic*]." ¹⁴

¹³ Jewish opposition to Zionism is most often found within Orthodox community. An extreme example of such is the polemical Jerusalem-based Orthodox group *Neturei Karta*, who state their number one reason for opposing Zionism is that "Zionist ideology is a transformation of Judaism from religion and spirituality into nationalism and materialism." *Neturei Karta* International, "The Palestinian Issue: The orthodox Jewish anti-Zionist position, Questions and Answers," <http://www.nkusa.org/Books/Pamphlets/Pamphlet.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2016). Conversely, Christian Zionism is growing in popularity, especially among the ranks of evangelicals. Organizations such as the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, and Christians United for Israel are prominent Christian Zionist groups.

¹⁴ European Parliament Working Group on Antisemitism, "EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism."

That being the case, the lexis must be intelligently reviewed and employed. Criticism aptly given is appropriate, but libelous slander is not. Consequently, serious historical conservation of the entire anti-Zionist movement, the apex of which was United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, must begin to take place. The 1975 decision was in no way a fluke and it should not be marginalized by today's historians and pundits as irrelevant. Its roots run deep and it is an example of the sort of anti-Semitism that invariably arises throughout history, though this time it was utilized for primarily political, rather than ideological or religious, purposes. That said, its manifestation and character should nonetheless be examined. A rational resolution to the unrest in Israel cannot be had until illogical and unreasonable rhetoric is set aside. It seems fitting to end with this thought from Daniel Patrick Moynihan – words matter.

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APPENDIX A




Figure 1. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, “Jewish *Yishuv* Settlement, 1881-1914,” map, http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/Jewish_Yishuv_settlement_1881_1914.htm (accessed October 5, 2016).




Figure 2. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Projected Subdivisions of Syria and Palestine,” map, <http://research.archives.gov/id/6997191?q=Palestine> (accessed December 28, 2015).

APPENDIX B

THE BASEL DECLARATION:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, or necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT:

It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments:

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and

subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French Government.
5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

6. That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.
7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhad Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (b).
8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (a) and

(b), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversions from *ad valorem* to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two Powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

9. It shall be agreed that the French government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.
10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.
11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.
12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.

I have further the honor to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged. I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies.

His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION:

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and with use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour

UNGA RESOLUTION 3379:

3379 (XXX). Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures,"

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, *inter alia*, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination,"

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered “that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being,”

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

UNGA Resolution 3379 Voting Record

Sponsored by: (25) Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cuba, Dahomey, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Mauritania, Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates.

Voted yes: (72) The 25 sponsoring nations above, and additionally 47 nations: Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia (formerly known as Democratic Kampuchea), Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, People’s Republic of China, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Voted no: (35) Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Abstaining: (32) Argentina, Bhutan, Bolivia, Batswana, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone,

Singapore, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

UNGA RESOLUTION 46/86:

Elimination of racism and racial discrimination

The General Assembly,

Decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of November 10, 1975.

UNGA Resolution 46/86 Voting Record (December 16, 1991)

Sponsored by: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Federal States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Republic of Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Marshall Islands, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Voted yes: (111) The sponsoring nations listed above, and additionally: Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Gabon, Haiti, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Thailand, Togo.

Voted no: (25) Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yemen.

Abstaining: (13) Angola, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe.

Absent: (15) Bahrain, Chad, People's Republic of China, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Senegal, Tunisia, Vanuatu.